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Abstract
Three of the most fundamental changes in US corporations since the early 1970s have been
(1) the increase in the importance of organizational capital in production, (2) the increase in
managerial income inequality, and (3) the increase in payouts to the owners. There is a unified
explanation for these changes: The arrival and gradual adoption of information technology
since the 1970s has stimulated the accumulation of organizational capital in existing firms.
Since owners are better diversified than managers, the optimal division of rents from this
organizational capital has the owners bear most of the cash-flow risk. In our model, the
IT revolution benefits the owners and the managers in large successful firms, but not the
managers in small firms. The resulting increase in managerial compensation inequality and
the increase in payouts to owner’s compare favorably to those we establish in the data.
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1 Introduction
The early 1970s marked the start of the information technology revolution. As its efficiency im-
proved and its price dropped, the use of IT spread, and its adoption affected all sectors of the
economy. By now, there is overwhelming evidence that computers have fundamentally altered
firms’ business processes, relationships with customers and suppliers, and internal organization.1
The adoption of IT not only led to an increase in the organizational capital of the average US
firm, it also increased heterogeneity across firms.2 This widespread accumulation of organiza-
tional capital creates a new problem for successful firms: how to distribute its rents? Unlike over
physical capital, the firms’ managers have de facto ownership rights over organizational capital.
They can leave and take some of this capital to a new firm. Our paper studies the distribution of
organizational rents between the owners and the managers in this new environment.
In the data, the distribution of the rents created by organizational capital has changed in
two major ways. First, the average US firm generates much larger payouts for its owners as a
fraction of value-added now than 35 years ago. Second, the cross-sectional dispersion of managerial
compensation is much larger now than 35 years ago. In large, successful firms, which accumulate
a lot of organizational capital, managerial compensation increased substantially, but it did not in
small firms. We propose a theory that ties the accumulation of organizational capital, ignited by
the IT revolution, to managerial compensation. It can quantitatively account for these two key
changes in the US economy.
The optimal managerial compensation contract that we derive insures the risk averse manager
against shocks to the firm’s productivity. This contract arises because the manager can only work
for one firm at the time, while the owner invests in a perfectly diversified portfolio of corporations.
The insurance is only partial because the manager has the right to quit, and transfer part of the
organizational capital to a new firm. The degree of portability of organizational capital governs
the value of the manager’s outside option, and the degree of risk sharing that can be sustained
between the manager and the owner.
Why does the arrival of IT increase the dispersion of managerial compensation? As long
as firms are small, the optimal contract provides the manager with compensation that is constant
(relative to aggregate output). The manager’s outside option is not a binding constraint. However,
when the firm size exceeds a threshold, management compensation (relative to aggregate output)
increases whenever the firm accumulates more organizational capital. The increased accumulation
of organizational capital, resulting from the IT revolution, improves the manager’s outside option.
To retain the manager, the owner of the firm increase managerial compensation in response to
high productivity. At the aggregate level, the change in the firm size distribution that results
from the adoption of IT triggers an endogenous shift from low-powered to high-powered incentive
1E.g., Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1997, 2000), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), and an entire volume of
contributions on organizational capital in the new economy Corrado, Haltiwanger and Sichel, eds (2005).
2Chun, Kim, Morck and Yeung (2007) document that IT originated a wave of Schumpeterian creative destruction
that led to higher firm-specific performance heterogeneity throughout traditional US industries.
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compensation contracts. Such a shift seems consistent with the current prevalence of pay-for-
performance employment contracts compared to the 1970s.
Why does the IT revolution increase the average payouts to owners of the firms? The life-cycle
profile of the owner’s payouts is increasing. The first payout is negative because of an initial sunk
cost required to start up the firm and because of a positive compensation for the manager. As the
firm grows, its output and profits rise on average. This increases the payouts to the owner because
management compensation stays constant initially and later rises with the firm’s size. On average,
this rise in pay is moderate compared to the owner’s, because the manager is more impatient
than the owner. Hence, the owner’s payout profile is back-loaded. The owner is compensated for
waiting. The more pronounced this back-loading, the higher are the owner’s payouts, averaged
across firms. The IT revolution increases back-loading because large firms, with a large amount of
organizational capital, become more prevalent. Hence, the owner’s payouts (relative to aggregate
output) rise during the IT adoption. Put differently, the average owner benefits more from the
knowledge economy than the average knowledge worker.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 3 defines the technology side of the model, describes
the compensation contract between manager and owner, defines an equilibrium with a continuum
of managers and firms, and defines a steady-state growth path. Section 4 highlights the properties
of the optimal compensation contract along a steady-state growth path. Its dynamics are fully
captured by the current and the highest-ever productivity level of the firm. Managerial compensa-
tion increases whenever a new maximum productivity level is reached. These two state variables
have a natural interpretation as the size and market-to-book ratio of the firm. Our model ties
these two characteristics to the value of the firm and the compensation of its management. Section
5.2 describes the calibration of the model. The IT revolution is captured as a gradual increase
in general productivity growth. The dissemination of this general purpose technology positively
affects the productivity of all existing firms. In order to keep the growth rate of aggregate out-
put constant along the transition path, we lower the growth rate of the second source of growth,
vintage-specific productivity growth. The magnitude of this compositional shift is calibrated to
match the observed decline in labor reallocation. A second key parameter is the portability of orga-
nizational capital. It is calibrated to match the increase in income inequality. We detail the labor
reallocation and the income inequality data used to justify these choices. Section 5 discusses the
results of the transition experiment. The model matches the two key trends we set out to explain:
the increase in the owner’s payouts relative to aggregate output and the increase in the dispersion
of managerial compensation. Interestingly, the model’s cross-sectional distribution of managerial
pay, post-IT, shares many features with the observed distribution: it is skewed, fat-tailed, and
has the correct relationship to the firm size distribution. Section 6 establishes the dramatic rise in
corporate payout rates since the early seventies, using three data sources. It also document the rise
in the valuation of these firms relative to their replacement costs. Finally, it provides additional
cross-sectional evidence for the effect of labor reallocation on payouts and valuations, which lends
further credibility to the mechanism we propose.
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2 Related Literature
In the absence of permanent monopoly profits, the value of the firm’s securities measures the value
of its capital. Hall (2001) measures the intangible capital stock as the difference between the
total value of US corporations and the value of the physical capital stock. By this measure, US
corporations have accumulated large amounts of intangible capital over the last decades. Consistent
with this, the IT revolution leads to an increase in the accumulation of organizational capital in
our model. Despite the absence of a persistent decline in the cost of capital, the model can account
for 40% of the run-up in firm valuations over the last 2 decades. Thus, our model provides an
underpinning for the re-emerging view that cash flows play a larger role in explaining variations
in the value of firms than previously thought. Recently, Larrain and Yogo (2007) and Bansal and
Yaron (2006) found more evidence of cash flow predictability in similarly broad payout measures.
The cash flow process in our paper is determined endogenously by technological change and market
forces.
In related work on technological change and stock market valuation, Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) argue that the IT revolution can account for the drop
in the value of the capital stock in 1973, and the rise of the stock market in the 1980s and
1990s. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) develop a general equilibrium model in which agents learn
about the profitability of new technologies that come online. Stock prices of new technologies
that are characterized by high uncertainty about their profitability, display bubble-like behavior.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) find that a $1 investment in computers increases a firm’s stock
market valuation by $12. They attribute this effect to strong complementarities between IT and
organizational capital (see also Bresnahan et al. (2002)).
Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003) identify the invention of
the Intel 4004 micro-processor in 1971 as the start of the IT revolution. This invention prompts
the start of a gradual drop in the relative price of IT equipment and increased spending on IT.
Information technology is a General Purpose Technology (GPT, Bresnahan and Trachtenberg
(1996)). As a GPT, IT has increased the productivity of all establishments, not only the new
ones.3 Chun et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of IT for the profitability and productivity of
traditional sectors of the economy. McGrattan and Prescott (2007) introduce intangible investment
to account for the strong performance in the US economy in the 1990s. Research and development,
advertisement, and investments in building organizations grew rapidly in this period (Corrado,
Hulten and Sichel (2006)).
Since we hold overall productivity growth fixed in our model, we interpret the IT revolution
as a shift in the composition of productivity growth towards such general productivity growth.
3For example, Wal-Mart experienced tremendous productivity gains from economies of scale in warehouse logistics
and purchasing, electronic data interchange and wireless bar code scanning. Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) cite Robert
Solow who notes “The technology that went into what Wal-Mart did was not brand new and not especially at the
technology frontiers, but when it was combined with with the firm’s managerial and organizational innovations, the
impact was huge. We don’t look enough at organizational innovation.”
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More precisely, the technology side of our model follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2005, 2007) with two
sources of technological progress. General productivity growth affects all existing establishments,
while vintage-specific productivity growth only increases the productivity of the newest vintage.
Since it is not possible to break down total productivity growth along a steady-state growth path,
our focus is on transitions between steady-states. The compositional shift in productivity growth is
calibrated to match the secular decline in the job reallocation rate in the US economy since the early
1970s, as documented by Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006) and Faberman (2006).
Intuitively, IT increases the growth rate of organizational capital in existing firms and enables the
successful firms to grow large. This results in fewer firm exits and less labor reallocation from
old- to new-vintage firms. The declining volatility of firm growth rates, documented by Davis et
al. (2006) for the entire universe of privately-held and publicly-traded firms, is consistent with
the decline in labor reallocation. Finally, the prediction that IT increased the fraction of output
produced in older establishments is also consistent with the evidence in Davis et al. (2006).
A large literature documents the increase of wage inequality in the US in the last three decades
and its relation to technological change (e.g., Violante (2002), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007), Autor,
Katz and Kearny (2007), and Acemoglu (2002) for a survey). Our paper contributes to this
literature by (i) generating an endogenous switch to high-powered incentives contracts and by (ii)
connecting the changing distribution of payouts to workers to the payouts to the owners of the
capital stock, and ultimately to firm value. This link is usually ignored in the literature, except by
Merz and Yahsiv (2003).
In our model, managerial compensation is governed by a long-term contract that insures the
manager against firm-specific shocks. There is scope for insurance when at least some of the
organizational capital is match-specific. Neal (1995) provides empirical evidence on the importance
of match-specific capital. The optimal dynamic compensation contract induces these managers to
remain at the firm as long as continuation of the match is beneficial. The contract is set up in
order to avoid managerial turnover. Hence, our model should be interpreted not as a model of
managerial turnover, but as a model of firm entry and exit.
Many of the features of these optimal contracts have been analyzed elsewhere, but we are
the first to argue these contracts play a key role in understanding the value of the firm, its cross-
sectional distribution, and how that distribution evolved over time. We are also the first to provide a
theoretical link between the size and book-to-market of a firm and its labor compensation practises.
The wage dynamics are similar to those in Harris and Holmstrom (1982)’s seminal paper, which
studies optimal long-term wage contracts with learning about the manager’s productivity. The
manager’s compensation displays downward wage rigidity . When the manager and the owner
have the same time discount rate, the compensation stays constant. Compensation increases when
the manager’s outside option increases. The latter occurs when the firm’s productivity reaches a
new all-time high. Therefore, the increase in compensation only occurs in successful, large firms.
In small firms, the manager’s compensation does not respond to increased productivity because
of the sunk costs. The change in the size distribution generates a regime shift from low-powered
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to high-powered incentives in compensation contracts. In the US, the adoption of high-powered
incentives contracts started in the 80’s. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) link this rise in stock-based
compensation to the wave of leveraged buyouts. We solve the model using techniques developed in
recursive dynamic contracts by Thomas and Worall (1988). However, in our model as in Krueger
and Uhlig (2005) and Lustig (2007), the manager’s outside option is determined endogenously.
Our model predicts a sizeable increase in within-industry between-establishment wage disper-
sion for skilled workers. This is consistent with the data (Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and Troske
(2004)). At the top end of the compensation scale, the dispersion of executive compensation has
increased even more in the last decades (Frydman and Saks (2006)). Gabaix and Landier (2008)
relate this increase in to the changing size distribution of firms. In their model, more talented exec-
utives are matched to larger firms. The observed change in the firm size distribution can generate
the observed change in the distribution of CEO compensation. Our model endogenizes both the
evolution of the size and the managerial compensation distribution. It generates the empirically
estimated sensitivity of log compensation to log size of 1/3 (Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2007)).
3 Model
We set up a model with a fixed population (mass 1) of managers. We emphasize that we are not
only thinking of the CEO, but rather of the entire management. Each manager is matched to an
owner to form an establishment. The formation of a new establishment incurs a one-time fixed
cost St. Establishments accumulate knowledge as long as the match lasts. We refer to this stock
of knowledge as organizational capital At. This organizational capital affects the technology of
production; it is a third factor of production besides physical capital and unskilled labor, earning
organizational rents.
We deviate from Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) by assuming that a part of the establishment’s
organizational capital is embodied in the manager. The main innovation of our work is to find the
optimal division of organizational rents between the owner and the manager, as governed by an
optimal long-term risk-sharing contract in the spirit of Harris and Holmstrom (1982). We solve for
the optimal contract recursively by using promised utility as a state variable (e.g., Thomas and
Worall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996)). The optimal contract maximizes the present discounted
value of the organizational rents flowing to the owner subject to the manager’s promise keeping
constraint and a sequence of participation constraints that reflect the manager’s inability to commit
to the current match. We deviate from Krueger and Uhlig (2005) by assuming that the owner has
limited liability. Separation occurs whenever there is no joint surplus in the match with the
manager anymore. Upon separation, a fraction 0 < φ < 1 of the organizational capital can be
transferred to the manager’s next match, while the remainder is destroyed. The market value of
the corporate sector in the model is the value of the physical capital stock plus the value of all
claims to that part of organizational rents that accrues to the owner. We start by setting up the
model and defining a steady-state growth path. In Section 5, we trace out the transition between
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two steady-state growth paths, which captures the advent and gradual adoption of information
technology (IT).
3.1 Technology
On the technology side, our model follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). Each establishment belongs
to a vintage s. An establishment of vintage s at time t was born at t−s. An establishment operates
a vintage-specific technology that uses unskilled labor (lt), physical capital (kt), and organizational
capital (At) as its inputs. Output generated with this technology is yt:
yt = zt (At)
1−ν F (kt, lt)
ν .
Following Lucas (1978), ν is the ‘span of control’ parameter of the manager. This parameter
governs the decreasing returns to scale at the establishment level.
We model two sources of productivity growth, which we label general and vintage-specific
growth. The general productivity level zt grows at a deterministic and constant rate gz:
zt = (1 + gz)zt−1.
General productivity growth affects establishments of all vintages alike. General productivity
growth is often referred to as disembodied technical change. In addition, it is skill-neutral because
it affects all three production inputs symmetrically.
Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the match-specific level of organizational capital,
At, follows an exogenous process. It is hit by random shocks ε, drawn from a distribution Γ:
4
logAt+1 = logAt + log εt+1, (3.1)
We do not explicitly model the learning process that underlies the accumulation process of organi-
zational knowledge.5 A new establishment can always start with a blue print or frontier technology
level θt: At ≥ θt. The productivity level of the blue print grows at a deterministic and constant
rate gθ:
θt = (1 + gθ)θt−1.
This vintage-specific growth is often referred to as embodied technical change.
4In principal, this distribution could depend on the vintage s. For example, older vintages could have shocks
that are less volatile. For simplicity, we abstract from this source of heterogeneity.
5However, the ε shocks can be interpreted as productivity gains derived from active or passive learning, from
matching, or from adoption of new technologies in existing firms (Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)). Additionally, they can
be interpreted as reduced-form for heterogeneity across managers, or for the outcomes from good or bad decisions
made by the manager. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen, Prez-Gonzlez and Wolfenzon (2007), and Bloom
and Van Reenen (2006) show that heterogeneity across managers leads to heterogeneity in firm outcomes. Jovanovic
and Nyarko (1982) explicitly model learning-by-doing.
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3.2 Contract Between Owner and Manager
Owner There is a representative owner of all establishments, who is perfectly diversified. He
maximizes the present discounted value of aggregate payouts from all establishments Dt using a
discount rate rt:
E0
∞∑
t=0
e−
∑t
s=0 rsDt. (3.2)
The owner is the residual claimant to the aggregate stream of cash flows that not already claimed
by the other factors:
Πt = Yt −WtLt − RtKt − Ct − S
a
t , (3.3)
where WtLt is the aggregate compensation of unskilled labor, RtKt that of physical capital, Ct the
aggregate compensation of all the managers of the establishments, and Sat = NtSt the total sunk
costs incurred for starting Nt new establishments. In other words, Πt is the sum of all rents from
organizational capital accruing to the owner. In addition, we assume that the owner owns the
physical capital stock. The aggregate payouts to the owner, Dt, are given by the organizational
rents and the factor payments to physical capital less physical investment:
Dt = Πt +RtKt − It, ∀t.
Since the sunk cost is lost, value-added is defined as Yt − S
a
t . For future reference, we define
the net payout share in the model as
NPS =
Dt
Yt − Sat
, GPS = NPS +
δKt
Yt − Sat
.
The gross payout share (GPS) adds the consumption of fixed capital to the NPS.
We define the organizational rents (before sunk costs and physical capital income) generated
by an existing establishment and accruing to the owner as:
pit = yt −Wtlt −Rtkt − ct.
These are the per period profits of the establishment as a going concern. The sunk costs were paid
only once when the establishment started up.
Manager The owner offers the manager a binding, i.e. non-renegotiable, contingent contract
{ct(h
t), βt(h
t)} at the start of the match, where {ct(h
t)} is the compensation of the manager as
a function of the history of shocks ht = (εt, εt−1, ...) and {βt(h
t)} governs whether the match is
dissolved or not in history ht. The manager is risk averse with CRRA parameter γ and time
discount rate ρm. In contrast to the owner, the manager cannot make a binding commitment: He
always has the option to leave to accept a job at another establishment.
The optimal contract is the contract that maximizes the total expected payoff of the owner
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subject to delivering initial utility v0 to the manager:
v0(h
0) = Eh0
[
∞∑
τ=0
e−ρmt
cτ (h
τ )1−γ
1− γ
]
.
In general, the history-dependence of the manager’s compensation makes this a complicated prob-
lem. However, as is common in the literature on dynamic contracts, we use the manager’s promised
utility as a state variable to make the problem recursive. The contract delivers vt in total expected
utility to the manager today by delivering current consumption ct and state-contingent consump-
tion promises vt+1(·) tomorrow. Promised utilities lie on a domain [v, v].
We use Vt(At, vt) to denote the value of the owner’s equity in an establishment with current
organizational capital At, and an outstanding promise to deliver vt to the manager. It is the value
of the owner’s claim to the rents from organizational capital. I.e., it does not include the value of
income from physical capital. Importantly, the owner has limited liability; the option to terminate
the contract when there is no joint surplus in the match. Limited liability implies the constraint:
Vt(At, vt) ≥ 0.
Finally, we use ωt(At) to denote the outside option of a manager currently employed in an
establishment with organizational capital At. When a manager switches to a new match, a fraction
φ of the organizational capital is transferred to the next match and a fraction 1− φ is destroyed.
Free disposal applies: If the manager brings organizational capital worth less than the current
blue print θt, then the new match starts off with the blue print technology for the new vintage.
Taken together, the organizational capital of a match of vintage t is max{φAt, θt}. The value of
the outside option ω is determined in equilibrium by a zero-profit condition for new entrants. In
the extreme case where all knowledge is destroyed upon termination of the match (φ = 0), the
outside option of the manager cannot depend on the amount of organizational capital accumulated
in the preceding match.
Recursive Formulation For given outside options {ωt} and discount rates {rt}, the optimal
contract in an establishment that has promised vt to its manager maximizes the owner’s value V
Vt(At, vt) = max
[
V̂t(At, vt), 0
]
, (3.4)
and
V̂t(At, vt) = max
ct,vt+1(·)
[
pit +
∫
e−rtV (At+1, vt+1)Γ(εt+1)dεt+1
]
, (3.5)
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by choosing the state-contingent promised utility schedule vt+1(·) and the current compensation
ct, subject to the law of motion for organizational capital (3.1), a promise keeping constraint
vt = u(ct) + e
−ρm
∫
βt+1(vt, εt+1)vt+1(At+1)Γ(εt+1)dεt+1
+e−ρm
∫
ωt+1(At+1)(1− βt+1(vt, εt+1))Γ(εt+1)dεt+1 (3.6)
and a series of participation constraints
vt+1(At+1) ≥ ωt+1(At+1). (3.7)
The indicator variable β is one if continuation is optimal and 0 elsewhere:
βt+1 = 1 if vt+1(At+1) ≤ v
∗(At+1)
βt+1 = 0 elsewhere.
The minimum value of zero on V in equation (3.4) reflects limited liability of the owner: The
match will be terminated if the joint surplus of the match is negative. If the match is dissolved,
the manager receives ωt+1(At+1) in promised utility. To obtain this recursive formulation, we have
used the fact that Vt(At, ·) is non-increasing in its second argument. For each At, there exists a
cutoff value v∗(At) that satisfies V̂t(At, v
∗(At)) = 0. The match is dissolved when the promised
utility exceeds the cutoff level: βt+1 = 0 if and only if vt+1(At+1) > v
∗(At+1). Put differently, only
establishments with high enough productivity At > At(vt) survive.
3.3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a price vector {Wt, Rt, rt}, an allocation vector {kt, lt, ct, βt}, an
outside option process {ωt}, and a sequence of distributions {Ψt,s, λt,s, Nt} that satisfy optimality
and market clearing conditions spelled out below.
Physical Capital and Unskilled Labor Unskilled labor l and physical capital k can be real-
located freely across different establishments. Hence, the problem of how much l and k to rent at
factor prices W and R, is entirely static. We use Kt and Lt to denote the aggregate quantities,
and we use At to denote the average stock of organizational capital across all establishments and
vintages:
At =
∞∑
s=0
∫
A
AΦt,sdA,
where Φt,s denotes the measure over organizational capital at the start of period t for vintage s.
Physical capital and unskilled labor are allocated in proportion to the establishment’s productivity
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level At:
kt(At) =
At
At
Kt
lt(At) =
At
At
Lt.
This allocation satisfies the first order conditions, and the market clearing conditions for capital
and labor. The fact that establishments with larger A have more physical capital and hire more
unskilled labor suggests an interpretation of A as the size of the establishment.
The equilibrium wage rate Wt for unskilled labor and rental rate for physical capital Rt are
determined by the standard first order conditions:
Wt = νztA
1−ν
t FL(Kt, Lt)
ν−1, Rt = νztA
1−ν
t FK(Kt, Lt)
ν−1
The factor payments to unskilled labor and physical capital absorb a fraction (1− ν) of aggregate
output Yt, where Yt is given by:
Yt = ztA
1−ν
t F (Kt, Lt)
ν .
In the remainder, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function F (k, l) = kαl1−α.
Organizational Rents A fraction νt of aggregate output Yt goes to organizational capital. These
organizational rents are split between the owners Πt, managers Ct, and sunk costs S
a
t = NtSt:
∞∑
s=0
∫
v
∫
A
pit(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v)−NtSt = Yt −WtLt − RtKt − Ct − S
a
t = Πt,
where the measure Ψt,s(A, v) is defined below. The second equality follows from (3.3) and ensures
that the goods market clears.
Discount Rate The payoffs are priced off the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution
(IMRS) of the representative owner. Just like the manager, the owner has constant relative risk
aversion preferences with CRRA parameter γ. His subjective time discount factor is ρo. Let gt
denote the rate of change in logDt. Then, the equilibrium log discount rate or “cost of capital” rt
is given by the owner’s IMRS:6
rt = ρo + γgt. (3.8)
Managerial Compensation Having solved for the value function {Vt(·, ·)} that satisfies the
Bellman equation above for given {ωt(·), rt}, we can construct the optimal contract for a new
6Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and the owner holds a diversified portfolio of establishments, our
setting is equivalent to one with a risk neutral owner who discounts future cash-flows as in equation (3.2). The cost
of capital evolves deterministically.
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match starting at t {ct+j(h
t+j), βt+j(h
t+j)} in sequential form.
Outside Option We assume the sunk cost St grows at the same rate as output. Free entry
stipulates that the equilibrium value of a new establishment to the owner is equal to the sunk cost
St:
Vt (max(φAt, θt), ωt(At)) = St, (3.9)
The first argument indicates that a new establishment starts with organizational capital equal to
the maximum of the frontier level of technology θt and the organizational capital the manager
brought from the previous match φAt. The total utility ωt(At) promised to the manager at the
start of a new match is such that the value of the new match is zero in expectation. Therefore,
equation (3.9) pins down the equilibrium ωt(At).
Law of Motion for Distributions We use χ to denote the implied probability density function
for At+1 given At. κ is an indicator function defined by the policy function for promised utilities:
κ (A′;A, v) = 1 if v′(A′;A, v) = v′, 0 elsewhere. Using this indicator function, we can define the
transition function Q for (A, v):
Q ((A′, v′), (A, v)) = χ(A′|A)κ′(A′;A, v).
We use Ψt,s to denote the joint measure over organizational capital A and promised utilities v for
matches of vintage s. Its law of motion is implied by the transition function:
Ψt+1,s+1(A
′, v′) =
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
Q((A′, v′), (A, v))λt,s(A, v)d(A, v), (3.10)
where λt,s(A, v) is the measure of active establishments in period t of vintage s:
λt,s(A, v) =
∫ A
0
∫ v
v
β(a, u)dΨt,s(a, u) ≥ 0. (3.11)
In equilibrium, the mass of new establishments created in each period Nt (entry) equals the mass
of matches destroyed in that same period (exit):
Nt =
∞∑
s=0
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
(1− βt,s(A, v))Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v) ≥ 0.
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3.4 Back-loading
The free entry condition implies that the expected net present discounted value of a start-up is
exactly zero: ∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
∞∑
j=0
e−
∑j
0
rsdspit+j(A, v)Ψt+j,s(A, v)d(A, v)− St = 0
Importantly, this does not imply that the organizational rents that flow to the owners are zero. As
long as discount rates r are strictly positive (Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)), the zero profit condition
in (3.9) implies that expected net payouts are strictly positive:∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
∞∑
j=0
pit+j(A, v)Ψt+j,s(A, v)d(A, v)− St > 0,
for two reasons. The first reason is a back-loading effect. The owners are compensated for waiting
in the form of positive payouts. The more back-loaded the payments are, the higher the expected
payments. The expected payout profile of an establishment is steeply increasing: the first payout
is a large negative number (-St), the establishment then grows and starts to generate higher and
higher profits (in expectation). Most of the organizational rents are paid in the future. Second,
there is a selection effect operative. Only the establishments that have fast enough organizational
capital growth, or equivalently productivity growth, survive. When we compute aggregate (or
expected) payouts, we are only sampling from the survivors who satisfy At > At(vt). This sample
selection effect is the second reason why aggregate payouts to owners are positive. As we show
below, the IT revolution increases the back-loading effect and therefore increases the net and gross
payout shares.
As pointed out by Hopenhayn (2002), selection among establishments can explain why Tobin’s
(average) q, qt =
V at
Kt
, is larger than one on average. The aggregate value of establishments is given
by the present discounted value of a claim to {Dt}. It equals the sum of all equity values across
all establishment minus sunk costs plus the value of the physical capital stock Kt:
V at =
∞∑
s=0
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
Vt(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v)− S
a
t +Kt ≥ Kt,
Tobin’s q is larger than one on average, in spite of the fact that new matches are valued at zero (net
of their physical capital). The reason is selection: when we compute q, we only sample survivors.
For example, for establishments of vintage s, we only sample from the ones with At > At(vt). For
future reference, we also define aggregate managerial wealth in the economy as:
Mat =
∞∑
s=0
∫
A
∫
v
vt(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v).
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3.5 Steady-State Growth Path
In a first step, we solve for a steady-state growth path in which all aggregate variables grow at
a constant rate. Aggregate establishment productivity {At} and the productivity of the newest
vintage {θt} grow at a constant rate gθ, the variables {rt, Rt, Nt} are constant, the economy-wide
productivity-level grows at a constant rate gz, and all other aggregate variables grow at a constant
rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν . (3.12)
We normalize the population L to one. To construct the steady-state growth path, we normalize
organizational capital by the frontier level of technology, and we denote the resulting variable
with a hat: Ât = At/θt. By construction, Â ≥ 1 for a new establishment. A key insight is that
the organizational capital of existing establishments, expressed in units of the frontier technology,
shrinks at a rate (1 + gθ):
log
(
Â′
)
= log
(
Â
)
− log (1 + gθ) + log (ε
′) . (3.13)
The prime denotes next period’s value. The lower gθ, the higher the growth rate of Â. Below, we
model the IT revolution as a decline in gθ, and therefore as an increase in organizational capital
growth in existing firms.
Appendix B contains a detailed definition of a steady-state growth path. It shows how to
express all other variables in efficiency units. Those variables are denoted by a tilde in rescaled
units. Finally, it reformulates the optimal contract along the steady-state growth path. The
Bellman equation is defined over the rescaled variables.
4 Properties of Wage Contract
Although the managerial compensation contract allows for complicated history-dependence, the
optimal contract along a steady-state growth path turns out to have intuitive dynamics. Two
state variables summarize all necessary information: the current level of productivity At, which we
have given an interpretation as the size of the establishment, and the highest level of productivity
recorded thus far Amax,t, which we will give an interpretation as the book-to-market ratio of the
establishment. Hence our theory describes the cross-section of size and value firms, a familiar
theme in the empirical asset pricing literature.
4.1 No Discount Rate Wedge
First, we consider the benchmark case in which the manager and the owner are equally impatient
(ρm = ρo). The promised utility state variable can be replaced by the running maximum of the
productivity process: Âmax,t = max{Âτ , τ ≤ t}. We let T denote the random stopping time when
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the establishment is shut down:
T = inf{τ ≥ 0 : V̂ (Âτ , v˜τ ) = 0}.
Proposition 4.1. Optimal management compensation along a steady-state growth path is deter-
mined by the running maximum of productivity: c˜t(Âmax,t) = max
{
c0, C
(
ω(Âmax,t), Âmax,t
)}
for
all 0 < t < T where the function C
(
v˜, Â
)
is defined such that the implied compensation stream
{c˜τ}
∞
τ=t delivers total expected utility v˜t to the manager.
Management compensation is constant as long as the running maximum is unchanged. The
constancy is optimal because of the concavity of the manager’s utility function, and arises as long
as the participation constraint does not bind. When the productivity process reaches a new high,
the participation constraint binds, and the compensation is adjusted upwards. Armed with this
result, we can define the owner’s value recursively as a function of At and the running maximum
Amax,t:
V˜ (Â, Âmax) = max
[
V̂ (Â, Âmax), 0
]
and
V̂ (Â, Âmax) = y˜ − W˜ l − Rk˜ − c˜(Âmax) + e
−(ρo−(1−γ)ĝ)
∫
V˜ (Â′, Â′max)Γ(ε
′)dε′,
subject to the law of motion for organizational capital in (3.13) and the implied law of motion for
the running maximum.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the optimal compensation. It plots At on the vertical
axis against Amax,t on the horizontal axis. By definition, At ≤ Amax,t, so that only the area on
and below the 45-degree line is relevant. New establishments start with At = Amax,t ≥ 1. When
an establishment grows and this growth establishes a new maximum productivity level, it travels
along the 45-degree line. When its productivity level falls or increases but not enough to establish
a new record, it travels along a vertical line in the (Amax,t, At) space. The region [0, 1/φ] for Amax
is an insensitivity region. Managerial compensation is constant (c˜t = c0) in this region. Wages are
constant for small establishments because of the sunk cost. The manager will not leave because his
productivity level is insufficient to justify a new sunk cost. To the right of this region, managerial
compensation is pinned down by the binding outside option that was ‘last’ encountered: c˜(Âmax,t).
As long as current productivity stays below the running maximum, the manager’s compensation
is constant. Along this ∆c˜ = 0 locus, the variation in current productivity is fully absorbed by
the net payouts to owners, as long as At stays above the V = 0 locus. When productivity falls
below this locus, the match is terminated. Every time current productivity exceeds the running
maximum, the establishment inches up along the 45-degree line, and managerial compensation
increases.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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Growth and Value In the (Âmax,t, Ât), there is a line with slope φ along which the owner’s value
V̂t = Ŝ is constant. This is the locus of pairs for which Ât = φÂmax,t. On this locus, the existing
establishment pays the same compensation as a new establishment that hires its management and
it has the same productivity:
V̂
(
φÂmax,t, ωt(Âmax,t)
)
= Ŝ, (4.1)
This means that the firm’s market-to-book ratio, or average q ratio, on this line is given by:
q = 1 +
V̂ (Ât, Âmax,t)
k̂t(Ât)
= 1 +
Ŝ
k̂t(Ât)
This suggests a natural interpretation of the ratio of current productivity relative to the running
maximum as an indicator of the market-to-book ratio. Compare two establishments with the same
size At. The establishment with the lower ratio of At/Amax,t has the same physical capital stock
kt(At), but higher (current and future) managerial compensation. This is because the manager
is compensated for the best past performance, which is substantially above current productivity.
Hence, V̂ (Ât, Âmax,t) is lower. These low At/Amax,t firms have a low market-to-book ratio 1+ V̂ /k.
They are value firms. High At/Amax,t firms are growth firms. In Figure 1, firms with the same
market-to-book ratio are on the same line through the origin. Value firms are farther from the
45-degree line, growth firms are closer. In Figure 2, which plots the market-to-book ratio on the
horizontal axis, value firms are on the left side of the picture. The model provides a link between
the book-to-market ratio of a firm and its managerial compensation.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Organizational Capital as Collateral The limited portability of organizational capital creates
the collateral in the matches necessary to sustain risk sharing. Two extreme cases illustrate this
point. In the first case, there is no capital specific to the match and there are no other frictions
(Krueger and Uhlig (2005)). The manager can transfer 100% of the organizational capital of the
establishment to a future match (φ = 1) and there are no sunk costs (St = 0). When φ = 1 in
Figure 1, the V̂ = Ŝ line coincides with the 45-degree line. Therefore, V̂t ≤ Ŝ = 0 everywhere.
Limited liability then implies that V̂t = 0. Because there is no relationship capital, no risk sharing
can be sustained, and the managers earn all the rents from organizational capital. The value of
the owner’s stake in the organizational capital is zero everywhere. This implies that V at = K̂t and
Tobin’s q equals one for all t.
In the second case, φ = 0: all of the organizational capital is match-specific (Atkeson and Kehoe
(2005)). The insensitivity regions extends over the entire domain of Â. The manager’s outside
option is constant so that perfect risk sharing can be sustained. In this case, the horizontal axis is
the Vt = St line. This means the owners gets all of the rents, which in turn leads to large q ratios.
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Compensation and Payout Dynamics We use 300-period simulations from a calibrated ver-
sion of the model to illustrate the dynamics; the details of the calibration are in section 5.2.
Figure 3 tracks a single, successful establishment through time. The left panel plots the realized
(Âmax,t, Ât) values, as in Figure 1. The right panel shows the corresponding time series for pro-
ductivity (or size) Â (solid line, measured against the left axis) and managerial compensation c˜
(dashed line, measured against the right axis). Because φ = 0.5, the insensitivity regions extends
until Â = 2. In that region the compensation is constant. When the establishment size exceeds 2,
around period 50, and leaves the insensitivity region, managerial compensation starts to increase
in response to increases in Â. The establishment travels along the 45-degree line in the left panel.
The manager’s compensation does not track the downward movements in productivity/size that
occur between periods 75 and 100. This is the first vertical locus of points in the left panel. The
second big run-up in productivity increases the manager wage once more. Eventually, when the
productivity level drops below the lower bound A(v), V = 0, the match is dissolved, and the worker
switches to a new match. This endogenous break-up is indicated by an arrow. A new match start
off at productivity level max
(
φÂ, 1
)
. This match only lasts for about 20 periods because of poor
productivity shock realizations. The third match on the figure lasts longer, but the establishment
never leaves the insensitivity region, so that wages are constant.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 compares the managers payouts c˜ (left panel) and the owner’s payouts p˜i (right panel)
for the same history of shocks as the previous figure. The left panel is identical to the right
panel in Figure 3. The key message of the figure is that the owner’s payouts are more sensitive
to productivity shocks than the manager’s compensation. The dashed line in the right panel is
more volatile than the dashed line in the left panel. In the insensitivity region, the owner bears
all the risk from fluctuating productivity. In addition, whenever the productivity level falls below
the running maximum, the owner’s payouts (profits) absorb the entire decline in output. This is
because the (essentially risk-neutral) owner provides maximal insurance to the risk averse manager.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Discount Rate Wedge
In this benchmark case, managerial compensation does not respond to decreases in firm size and
productivity. Hence, the management is completely ‘entrenched’. In the quantitative section of
the paper, we consider a less extreme version, by allowing for a wedge between the discount rates
of the management and the owners. In particular, we consider the case in which the manager
discounts cash flows at a higher rate than the owner (ρm > ρo). This is the relevant case when the
manager faces binding borrowing constraints, has a lower willingness to substitute consumption
over time, or simply has a higher rate of time preference.
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We let tmax denote the random stopping time that indicates when the participation constraint
was last binding:
tmax = sup{T > τ ≥ 0 : ω(Âτ) = v˜τ}.
Proposition 4.2. Optimal management compensation evolves according to: ct = c(Âtmax)e
−γ(ρm−ρo)(t−tmax)
for all 0 < t < T . We define c(Âtmax) such that {c˜τ}
∞
τ=tmax delivers total expected utility ω(Âtmax)
to the manager.
The additional state variable is a discounted version of the running maximum; it depreciates
at a rate that is governed by the rate of time preference gap between the manager and the owner.
In the absence of binding participation constraints, managerial compensation c grows at a rate
smaller than the rate of value-added on the steady-state growth path. Put differently, whenever
the current productivity of the establishment declines below its running maximum, the manager’s
scaled compensation c˜ drifts down. Management is less ‘entrenched’. The left panel of Figure
4 illustrates this downward drift, for example between periods 150 and 200. This compensation
structure further front-loads management compensation and further back-loads the owner’s payoffs.
Therefore it increases average payouts to the owner.
[Figure 5 about here.]
5 The IT Revolution: Transition Experiment
5.1 Constant Cost of Capital Transition
Wemodel the IT revolution as a gradual increase in general (disembodied) productivity growth gz ↑.
The arrival of this general purpose technology increases productivity growth for all establishments
regardless of vintage. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the total productivity growth
rate of the economy gt is constant at its initial steady-state growth path value:
7
g =
(
(1 + gt,z)(1 + gt,θ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν . (5.1)
Holding fixed g, the increase in gz corresponds to a decrease in the rate of depreciation of or-
ganizational capital Â in the stationary version of the model: gθ ↓. One interpretation is that
IT allows existing firms in traditional industries to remain competitive, and grow larger. Their
organizational capital depreciates less quickly now than thirty years ago.
In Figure 1, a lower gθ has two distinct effects. First, it reduces the rate at which Ât drifts
down along a vertical line. Second, it shifts more probability mass to higher realizations of Âmax.
So, a decrease in gθ shifts more probability mass closer to the 45-degree line, and more mass in
the northeast quadrant. The IT revolution creates larger establishments and more of them are
7First, there is little evidence that the last 35 years have seen higher average GDP growth g than the 35-year
period that preceded it. Second, changing GDP growth along the transition path is computationally challenging.
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growth rather than value firms. The increased importance of growth firms seems consistent with
the evidence.
Establishments accumulate more organizational capital and are longer-lived in the new steady
state. Because more establishments will grow larger, the managers’ outside option constraint will
bind more frequently. This increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. In addition, the arrival
of more large establishments increases the back-loading of the owner’s payouts. This raises the
owner’s average payouts in the cross-section as a fraction of output. Managerial compensation is
more front-loaded.
We study the transition between a low and a high general-purpose innovation growth path. At
t = 0, agents know the entire future path for {gt,θ}
T
t=0, although the arrival of the GPT itself at t = 0
is not anticipated at t = . . . ,−2,−1. Appendix C defines the constant discount rate transition. It
also explains the reverse shooting algorithm we use to solve for the entire transition path. This
is a non-trivial problem because we need to keep track of how the cross-sectional distribution of
(A, v) evolves. We then simulate the economy forward for a cross-section of 5,000 establishments,
starting in the initial steady state. We assume the change in the relative importance of growth rates
is accomplished in 20 years. However, the economy continues to adjust substantially afterwards
on its way to the final steady state. Figure 6 summarizes these transitional dynamics. These
dynamics are similar to what we will document in the data in Section 6. Even though we compute
a constant cost-of-capital transition, all important aggregate variables, such as log TFP, vary along
the transition path. Interestingly, the model generates slow productivity growth in the 1970s and
faster growth in the 1980s and 1990s (last panel of Figure 6).
[Figure 6 about here.]
5.2 Benchmark Parameter Choices
In order to assess its quantitative implications, we calibrate the model at annual frequency. Table
1 summarizes the parameters.
Production Technology and Preferences The parameter ν governs the decreasing returns
to scale at the establishment level. It is set to .75, at the low end of the range considered by
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). The other technology and preferences parameters are chosen to match
the depreciation, the average capital-to-output ratio and the average cost of capital for the US
non-financial sector over the period 1950-2005. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to .06 based
on NIPA data. Next, we calibrate the Cobb-Douglas productivity exponent on capital, α. Because
there is no aggregate risk, the rate of return on physical capital is deterministic in the model. In
equilibrium, that rate equals the discount rate. Both are fixed along the transition path. From the
Euler equation for physical capital, we get:
r = (1− τc)
(
1− δ + αν
Y
K
)
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We compute the cost of capital r in the data as the weighted-average realized return on equity and
corporate bonds; it is 5.5%. The weights are given by the observed leverage ratio. The average
corporate tax rate τc is 28%. The average capital-to-output ratio is 1.77. The above equation then
implies αν = 0.23. As a result, α = 0.30. Appendix D provides more details.
We chose the rate of time preference of the owner ρo = .02 such that his subjective time discount
factor is exp(−ρo) = .98. In our benchmark results, we assume that the manager is less patient:
ρm = .03. Finally, we choose a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1.6. This is the value that
solves equation 3.8 given our choices for r, ρo, and given the average growth rate of real aggregate
output of g = 0.022.
[Table 1 about here.]
Organizational Capital Accumulation and Transfer Technology To calibrate the organi-
zational capital accumulation, its portability, and the sunk costs of forming a new match, we match
the excess job reallocation rate and the firm exit rate in the old steady state to those observed in
the data in 1970-74, and we match the increase in managerial wage inequality to that in the data.
The data are described in Section 6 below.
Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), we assume the ε shocks are log-normal with mean ms
and standard deviation σs. We abstract from the dependence on these parameters on the vintage
s. For parsimony, the mean ms is set zero. However, younger matches (lower s) will grow faster
in equilibrium because of selection, even without age-dependence in ms. The standard deviation
σs = σ of these shocks is chosen to generate an excess job reallocation rate of 19% in the initial
steady state. This choice matches the 1970-74 reallocation rate in the data. The size of the sunk
cost (S) is chosen to match the entry-exit rates in the initial steady state. The sunk cost is equal
to 6.5 times the annual cash flow generated by the average firm. This delivers an entry/exit rate
of 4.3% in the initial steady-state, again matching the 1970-74 data. The portability or match-
specificity parameter φ governs the increase in wage dispersion in the model. We set it equal to
0.5, which means that 50% of organizational capital is transferable to a next match. This value
matches the increase in intra-industry wage inequality described below.
Productivity Growth Composition In the baseline experiment, we assume the change in
the composition of growth to gnew,z occurs over 20 years, and we assume it starts in 1971. After 20
years, in 1990, productivity growth settles down at (gnew,z, gnew,θ). The actual transition to a new
steady-state growth path takes much longer. The change in the composition of growth is calibrated
to match the decline in reallocation rates in the data from 19% to 11%. General productivity growth
increases from gold,z = 0.3% in the initial steady state to gnew,z = 1.45% in the new steady-state.
Correspondingly, vintage-specific productivity growth decreases from gold,θ = 5.5% to 0.8%.
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5.3 Main Results: Compensation and Size Distribution
We are now ready to describe the main results from our transition experiment. We start by
comparing the size and compensation distribution in the initial and final steady states, as well as
its evolution during the transition. Next, we trace out the dynamics of key aggregates such as the
payout share.
Figure 7 illustrates how a relatively modest change in the size distribution of firms, brought
about by a change in the composition of productivity growth, translates in a much larger change
in the distribution of compensation. The left panel plots the log compensation of managers (log c˜)
against the log of establishment size (log Â) in the initial steady-state growth path of the model.
The right panel shows the new steady state, after the adoption of IT is complete. Each dot rep-
resents one establishment in the cross-section. The key to the amplification is the compensation
contract. Because of the sunk cost, the optimal contract features a lower bound on size below
which the skilled wage does not respond to changes in size. Above a certain size, the manager’s
compensation only responds to good news about the establishment’s productivity. In the old steady
state, few establishments become large enough to exceed the insensitivity range. Managerial com-
pensation hardly responds to changes in size; there is little cross-sectional variation in managerial
compensation in the left panel. In the initial steady-state, the kurtosis of log size is 1.92, while
the skewness is .02. The right panel shows that this is no longer true in the new steady-state. Es-
tablishments live longer on average and the successful ones grow larger. The log size distribution
is more skewed than in the initial steady-state. The figure shows a strong positive cross-sectional
relationship between size and managerial compensation. Thus, the model endogenously generates
a shift from low-powered to high-powered incentive compensation contracts.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The distribution of managerial compensation has much fatter tails than the size distribution, as
shown in Figure 8. Its left panel shows the histogram of log compensation in the new steady state;
the right panel is the histogram of log size. Both were demeaned. The distribution of managerial
compensation is more skewed and it has fatter tails than the size distribution. The kurtosis of log
compensation is 19.82, compared to 3.38 for log size. The skewness is 3.81 for log compensation,
compared to .47 for log size.
[Figure 8 about here.]
There is a large finance literature that studies compensation for top managers (e.g., Frydman
and Saks (2006) and Kaplan and Rauh (2007)). Gabaix and Landier (2008) and other studies have
documented that managerial compensation is well-described by a power function of size, a finding
referred to as Roberts’ law. In our model too, the compensation distribution has much fatter tails
than a log-normal. On average, the relation between compensation and size in the new steady
state satisfies log c˜ = α + κ log Â. The slope coefficient κ is .24 in the new steady-state, similar to
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what is found in the empirical literature. Our model therefore not only provides a rationale for the
large and skewed increase in managerial compensation, but is also quantitatively consistent with
the observed size-compensation distribution.
Our model also has implications for the size distribution of firms. Luttmer (2005) and others
show that the size distribution for large firms follows a Pareto distribution. The same is true for
the large firms in our new steady-state. Figure 9 shows that the relation between log rank and log
size is linear for large establishments. Quantitatively, the slope of that relationship is somewhat
too steep compared to the data with a Pareto coefficient around -1.5 instead of -1. For small firms,
the relationship is less steep, a finding reminiscent of the city-size literature.8
[Figure 9 about here.]
Table 2 reports the impact of the change in the composition of growth on the distribution of
compensation and productivity. The log of establishment productivity (TFP) is given by (1 −
ν) log Â. The log of the manager’s wage is given by log c˜. The left panel reports the cross-sectional
standard deviation, IQR, and IDR for log wages; the right panel does the same for log TFP.
The first (last) line shows the values in the initial (final) steady-state. The numbers in between
are five-year averages computed along the transition path. Small changes in the productivity (or
size) distribution cause big changes in the distribution of compensation. The standard deviation of
managerial compensation increases by 7.3 percentage points in the first 35 years of the transition,
similar to what we reported for the increase in within-industry wage dispersion in the data.9 In
the next ten years from 2006-2015, the standard deviation of log wage dispersion is predicted to
increase by another 4.5 percentage points and the IDR by as much as 11.5 percentage points.10 In
sum, the shift towards high-powered incentives leads to a substantial increase in income inequality.
The increase in productivity dispersion that generate this explosion in compensation inequality
is rather modest. The standard deviation increases by only 1.5 percentage points in the first 35
years of the transition. The IQR for increases from 18.3 to 18.4% and the IDR from 29.2 to
31.8% over the same period. Overall, productivity dispersion in our model is somewhat smaller
than what is found in the data. Using 1977 US manufacturing data at the 4-digit industry level,
Syverson (2004) reports a within-industry IQR of log TFP between 29 and 44%. Increasing log
TFP dispersion in the model would give rise to too much reallocation, absent other frictions.
[Table 2 about here.]
8While Gabaix (1999), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2006), and others find that the city-size distribution has
a Pareto distribution, Eeckhout (2004) argues that it is log-normal. The discrepancy comes from the fact that
Eeckhout studies all “places” (including the smallest towns), whereas the others focus only on (much larger) cities.
Our model has a firm-size distribution with similar characteristics. We follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2007) who
argue to estimate the Pareto coefficient b from a regression of the form log(Rank-1/2)=a-b log(Size).
9In the model, unskilled wages are equalized across establishments and do not affect the dispersion.
10In the new steady-state, compensation becomes very skewed: the IDR increases so much that the IQR actually
decreases.
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5.4 Main Results: Payout Shares and Valuation Ratios
Table 3 summarizes the other main aggregates of interest. The first column shows the excess job
reallocation rate. We calibrated the shift in the composition of productivity so as to match the
initial steady-state value of 19% as well as the subsequent decline to 12.2% over the ensuing 35
years. The model successfully matches the decline in entry/exit rate (on a steady-state growth
path those are identical). The exit rate starts from 4.3% (chosen to match the sunk costs) and
declines to 3.0% by 2001-05. In the data, it declined from 4% to 2.5%. The exit rate is highest
in the first ten years of the transition because there is a shake-out of establishments that are no
longer profitable under the increased managerial compensation.
[Table 3 about here.]
The third column shows that our model generates a 7% increase in the net payout share, an
important and new stylized fact we document in Section 6. The NPS increases gradually from 3.3%
in the initial steady state to 10.3% in the early 2000s, tracking the data. The model generates
this increase in average payouts because some firms become larger than before, which increases the
back-loading of payments to the owners. When computing average payouts, we are only sampling
from survivors. The gross payout share in the fourth column, which adds in depreciation of physical
capital, shows a similar increase.
The last three columns of Table 3 report valuation ratios. As establishments start to live longer
and accumulate more organizational capital, the aggregate value of organizational capital starts to
increase. This is the same selection effect: We are only sampling the survivors when computing the
market value of matches. Correspondingly, Tobin’s q increases from 1.4 in 1971-75 to 1.6 in 2001-05
(Column 5). The value of organizational capital as a fraction of value-added (V at −Kt)/(Yt − S
a
t )
increases from 0.83 to 1.18, a 42% increase (Column 6). The increase in the data from 1.54 to 2.41
represents a 45% increase (See Section 6).
Managerial workers capture only part of this increase in organizational rents because of the
sunk costs and limited portability of organizational capital. The sunk costs create an insensitivity
range in which managerial compensation does not respond to productivity shocks. In addition, the
discount rate wedge imputes a downward drift to the managerial compensation. As matches live
longer, managers end up with a smaller share of the surplus. This is consistent with the findings of
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007), who document a negative correlation between innovations
to future cash flow growth for financial (owners) and human wealth (managers). The managerial
wealth-to-output ratio (Ma/(Y − Sa)) declines from 8.3 to 7.2% (Column 7). The model thus
implies a large transfer of wealth from the managers to the owners.
Figure 10 shows an enormous amount of heterogeneity in the evolution of managerial wealth to
value-added (M/(Y −Sa)), echoing the increase in managerial compensation dispersion documented
earlier. We sorted all managers by their final steady-stateM/(Y −Sa)- ratio. Managers in the 95th
percentile saw a large increase, managers in the 90th percentile maintained the status quo, while
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all other managers (especially those in the smaller establishments) suffered a decline in wealth.
Managers in the 5th see their wealth decline from 8 to 6.5 times (per capita) value added.
[Figure 10 about here.]
5.5 Stock Market Sampling Bias
The increase in aggregate Tobin’s q generated by the model is smaller than in the data. This
could partially be due to a reduction in the cost of capital during that period that we deliberately
abstract from (Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2000)). However, it is possible that the
data overstate the increase in Tobin’s q. Our model helps us understand this potential bias. Table
4 shows the cross-sectional distribution of Tobin’s q, where establishments were sorted by market
value. In the 95th percentile, market values increased from 1.94 to 2.48, an increase of 29%. In the
10th percentile, the increase is only 6%.
The Flow of Funds (FoF) computes the market value of all equities outstanding as the value of
all common and preferred stock for firms listed on the NASDAQ, the NYSE, AMEX, and other US
exchanges plus the FOF estimate of closely held shares.11 This FoF estimate effectively imputes
the returns on the publicly traded firms to non-traded firms. Because publicly traded firms are
much more likely to be drawn from the 95th than the 10th percentile of the entire firm distribution,
the imputation procedure may overstate the increase in Tobin’s q. Put differently, the stock market
over-samples larger establishments because of selection.
[Table 4 about here.]
5.6 Robustness
Different Portability The degree of portability φ governs several key aspects of the model.
WE studied both a higher value (φ = .75) and a lower value (φ = 0) than our benchmark case
(φ = .50). When we lower the portability parameter φ from .5 to 0, the model no longer generates
any increase in managerial compensation. Indeed, the managers are fully insured and the owners
capture all organizational rents. The owners’ initial net payout share is much higher (8% versus
3.3%). The IT revolution leads to a larger increases in the owners’ wealth V a relative to value-
added, and higher aggregate valuation ratios: Tobin’s q goes up from 1.40 to 1.76. This increase is
almost twice as big as in the benchmark case. In sum, the predictions for valuation ratios improve,
but the predictions for wage dispersion are counter-factual.
In contrast, increasing φ to a value of 0.75 gives managers more ownership rights to organi-
zational capital. As a result, not only is initial income dispersion higher (the standard deviation
of log wages is 9.6% instead of 0.9% in the initial steady-state), the increase in dispersion is also
higher. The standard deviation increases by 14.9, the IQR by 8 and the IDR by 42 percentage
11It also subtracts the market value of financial companies and the market value of foreign equities held by US
residents.
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points from the initial situation to 2001-05. These increases are much larger than in the benchmark
case and fit the increase in managerial income inequality in the data better. Figure 11 summa-
rizes the pronounced shift towards high-powered incentives. Some other desirable features of the
φ = .75 calibration are that (i) Robert’s coefficient, which measures the elasticity of managerial
compensation to firm size, is 0.32, exactly matching the data, and (ii) the Pareto coefficient of the
firm size distribution is -1.05, also very close to empirical values that are estimated around 1. The
only downside is that the increase in valuation ratios is only half as big as in the benchmark case.
[Figure 11 about here.]
No Discount Rate Wedge We also solved a calibration where the owner and manager share the
same subjective time discount factor ρo = ρm. Making the manager more patient reduces the back-
loading effect and therefore reduces the value accumulation to the owner. The top panel of Table
5 shows that the model with no wedge can still generate an increase in compensation inequality,
albeit a smaller one. The increase in the net payout share is also mitigated; the model generates
a 3.6% increase over the last 30 years (bottom panel). Conversely, the effects are stronger for a
higher discount rate wedge (2%). Overall, the effects of the discount rate wedge are quantitative,
not qualitative in nature.
[Table 5 about here.]
A Decline in Idiosyncratic Volatility The increase in valuation ratios in the data suggests
that a simpler model, based on a decline in the volatility of shocks to firm productivity σ, cannot
account for the facts. Because an establishment’s operations are discontinued when the match has
no value (V ≥ 0 in equation 3.4), it has an option-like structure. A decrease in volatility would
reduce the value of the option, and therefore reduce valuation ratios. Our explanation features
this increase in valuation ratios.
A Rise in Portability Frydman and Saks (2006) argues that general skills became more im-
portant for managers, and provides this as a potential explanation for the rise in executive pay.
To the extent that this is also true for the broader group of managers we study, such an effect
could be modeled as an increase in the transferability of organizational capital, φ. An increase in
φ would lead to less risk-sharing over time and a higher compensation elasticity with respect to
size. Since more of the organizational rents would go to the manager, the net payout share and
firm valuation ratios would increase by less. Finally, an increase in φ would lead to more firm exit
and more labor reallocation. The decreasing reallocation and exit rates and the strong increase in
owner’s payouts and q suggest that a decline in φ cannot be the whole story.
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6 Supporting Evidence from Data
Finally, we provide supporting evidence from the data. Several of the model’s parameters we chosen
to match moments of the data we describe below. This is true for the decline in job reallocation,
the increase in wage dispersion, and the initial exit rate. All other data moments constitute over-
identifying restrictions implied by the model. Most notably, these are the facts on the dynamics
of the net payout share, on the elasticity of managerial compensation to size, on the firm size
distribution, and on the dynamics of the exit rate.
6.1 Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion
We provide three sources of data, all of which document a large increase in wage inequality.
The first and broadest measure studies wages of all workers. The data are from the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The unit of observation is an establishment, and the data report the average wage. We calculate
the within-industry wage dispersion from a panel of 55 2-digit SIC-code industries, and average
across industries. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the cross-sectional standard deviation of log wages
increased by 7.3, the inter-quartile range by 5.4, and the inter-decline range by 14.7 percentage
points between 1975-1979 and 2000-2004.12
The second body of evidence comes from managerial wages. While our model has implications
for overall wage inequality, managerial data arguably provide a cleaner match. We use wage
income data from the March Current Population Survey and select only workers in managerial
occupations (See Appendix A.6). Panel B of Table 6 shows that in this sample, the cross-sectional
standard deviation of log wages increased by 9.4, the inter-quartile range by 11.3, and the inter-
decline range by 19.6 percentage points between 1975-1979 and 2000-2004. Hence the increase in
managerial compensation is more pronounced than for the population at large.
[Table 6 about here.]
The third and most narrow measure focusses on the top of the compensation scale. Frydman
and Saks (2006) documents a strong increase in executive compensation. They measure total
compensation (salaries, bonuses, long-term bonus payments, and the Black-Scholes value of stock
option grants) for the three highest-paid officers in the largest 50 firms in 1960 and 1990. Panel C
of Table 6 shows a spectacular increase in the dispersion of top managers’ pay.13 Since the mid-
1970s, the inter-quartile and inter-decile range of log compensation more than doubled to 1.5 and
12According to Dunne et al. (2004), increasing within-industry, between-establishment wage dispersion accounts
for a large fraction of the increase in overall income inequality in the US. This is true especially for non-production
workers, which includes managers. They study US manufacturing establishments. Between 1977 and 1988, the
between-plant coefficient of variation for non-production worker’s wages increased from 44% to 56%, while the
within-plant dispersion actually decreased. They also document an increase in the dispersion of productivity between
plants.
13We thank Carola Frydman for graciously making these data available to us.
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2.6, respectively. The cross-sectional standard deviation increased by 43 log points. The inequality
and the increase in inequality are strongest for this group.
6.2 Declining Excess Job Reallocation
The excess job reallocation rate is a direct measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of establishment
growth rates. It is defined as the the sum of the job creation rate plus the job destruction rate less
the net employment growth rate. Before 1990, we only have establishment-level reallocation data
for the manufacturing sector. Figure 12 shows that the excess reallocation rate in manufacturing
declined from 10.9% in 1965-1969 to 8.4% in 2000-2005, and further to 7.8% between 2006-2007.I.
After 1990, the BLS provides establishment-level data for all sectors of the economy. Over the
1990-2007 sample, the excess reallocation rate declined from 10.6 to 7.2% in manufacturing, from
15 to 12.4% in services, and from 15.6 to 12.8% in the entire private sector. Half of this decline is
due to a decline in entry and exit rates for establishments, from 4% to 2.5%. The other half is due
to a decline in expansions and contractions of existing establishments.
[Figure 12 about here.]
Similar trends have been documented in firm-level (rather than establishment-level) data. Davis
et al. (2006) document large declines in the dispersion and the volatility of firm growth rates for the
US economy, either measured based on employment or sales. The employment-weighted dispersion
of firm growth rates declined from .70 in 1978 to .55 in 2001, while the employment-weighted
volatility of firm growth rates declined from .22 in 1980 to .12 in 2001. The former measures the
cross-sectional standard deviation of firm growth rates, while the latter measures the standard
deviation of firm growth rates over time.14 This decline in volatility is present across sectors.
Finally, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) constructs a proxy for establishment-level reallocation
by studying intra-industry job flows. This is the only series that is continually available for our
sample period. The excess reallocation rate for the non-financial sector declines from 19% in 1960
to an average of 11.5% in 2000. This 19-11.5% change is what we calibrate to in our benchmark
model.
6.3 Corporate Payouts
The previous section showed that our model generates a 7.7% increase in the net payout share,
following the IT revolution. This section measures the payout share for the aggregate corporate
(non-farm, non-financial) sector in the US, and shows that the data show the same size increase.
14Comin and Philippon (2005) show that there is an increase in volatility for the subsample of publicly traded
firms. Our analysis is for the entire non-financial sector, publicly-traded and privately-held. The discrepancy
between the findings for public and for all firms may have to do with private firms that go public earlier. The IPO
decision is outside of our model.
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6.3.1 Measuring Corporate Payouts
In our model, corporations issue shares which are claims to the physical capital stock. The
model abstracts from the decomposition of corporate liabilities into equity and debt because the
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. In the data, corporations issue both equity and debt, and they
may purchase financial assets. The aggregate value of corporations is the sum of the value of all
securities issued by these corporations less the value of financial assets (Hall (2001)). We use
V at = ptst to denote the value of a claim to the aggregate US capital stock at time t; pt equals the
price (per share) of a claim to the US capital stock and st the number of shares. The payouts Dt
to the owners come in two forms: cash (denoted Dct ) and net repurchases (D
nr
t ).
Dt = Divt + Intt︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash
+ pt(st−1 − st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
repurchases
Cash payments include dividend payments to equity holders (Divt) and interest payments to bond
holders and other lenders (Intt). The other payments measure net repurchases of shares st at a
price pt. In the data, this includes net equity repurchases and net debt repurchases. Net equity
repurchases are defined as total equity repurchases less issuance of new equity. Net debt repurchases
are defined as the change in financial assets less the change in financial liabilities. As in the model,
the value of the US corporate sector is the present discounted value of total payouts Dt+j:
V at = Et
∞∑
j=0
e−
∑j
s=t rsDt+j ,
where rt is the discount rate.
The stand-in corporation’s flow budget constraint links the corporate cash flows to its payouts.
The stand-in US corporation at time 0 maximizes its value V a0 by choosing gross investment in
physical capital It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt and it decides how much labor to hire subject to the flow
budget constraint for all t ≥ 0:
Dt = Yt − S
a
t − Compt − It − Taxt, (6.1)
whereYt − S
a
t denotes value-added in the corporate sector, Compt = WtLt + Ct denotes the total
compensation of unskilled and managerial (or skilled) labor, and Taxt denotes corporate taxes.
15
To give an example of how this flow budget constraint works, suppose that the US corporate sector
has more internal funds than it invests in a given year t: Yt−S
a
t −Compt−Taxt−D
c
t > It. Suppose
also that it invests this surplus in the money market. Then its financial assets on the balance sheet
increase, this shows up as a net repurchase (net reduction in net financial liabilities), and hence a
non-cash payout to securities holders: pt(st−1−st) = D
nc
t = Yt−S
a
t −Compt−Taxt−D
c
t − It > 0.
15There are no taxes in the model. In the data, we want to compute the payouts to securities holders and hence
we take out all the taxes paid by corporations.
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We use three different approaches to measure the corporate payout rate. The first one is to
measure the payouts directly in the Federal Flow of Funds (Section 6.3.2). The second approach
uses the corporate flow budget constraint to back out the corporate payouts from the National
Income and Products Accounts (Section 6.3.3). The last measure is based on firm-level data from
Compustat (Section 6.3.4).
6.3.2 Corporate Payouts in the Flow of Funds
The data to construct our measure of firm value were obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds’ flow
tables for the non-farm, non-financial corporate sector. The aggregate value of the corporate sector
V at is measured as the market value of equity plus the market value of all financial liabilities minus
the market value of financial assets. We correct for changes in the market value of outstanding
bonds by applying the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index to the level of outstanding corporate
bonds (which are valued at book values) at the end of the previous year. The payouts Dt are
measured as the sum of dividend payments and interest payments, plus net equity repurchases
plus the increase in financial assets less the increase in financial liabilities. The net payout share
(NPS) is the sum of net payouts to securities holders divided by gross value-added:
NPSt =
Dt
Yt − Sat
.
Appendix A.1 contains a detailed description of the data construction. Larrain and Yogo (2007)
use a similar measure of payouts for the non-financial corporate sector.
Column (1) of Table 7 shows five-year averages for the NPS from these Flow of Funds data.
After an initial decline from the second half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s, the NPS
increases virtually without interruption from 1.7% to 9.4% of value-added over the next three
decades, an increase of 7.7 percentage points. This is exactly the increase generated by the model.
Our model does not speak to the decomposition of the net payout share. Berk, Stanton and Zechner
(2005) investigate the optimal capital structure problem in an optimal contracting model similar
to ours. Appendix A.1 shows how the composition of the payout share has evolved, and cites some
of the recent literature on this topic.
[Table 7 about here.]
6.3.3 Corporate Payouts in the National Income Accounts
Instead of using the Flow of Funds data to get a direct measure of payouts, we can also infer
corporate payouts indirectly from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data. Using
the corporate flow budget constraint (6.1), total corporate payouts can be measured as gross value-
added for non-financial corporate business minus compensation of employees minus corporate taxes
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minus investment. Appendix A.2 contains the details.16 By dividing the adjusted payouts by value-
added, we create the net payout share from NIPA data. The same appendix also shows how to
decompose payouts into a cash and a non-cash component based on NIPA data. Column 2 in
table 7 lists the five-year average NPS using the NIPA measure. We obtain a similar pattern as in
Column 1: After an initial decrease from 3.7% in the last part of the 60’s to 2% in the first part of
the seventies, the NPS climbs to 7.6% in 2000-2004. The total increase between 1970-74 and 2000-
2004 is about 5.6 percentage points. Figure 13 offers a direct comparison of the 8-quarter moving
averages of the NPS series obtained from NIPA data (dashed line) and from the FoF (solid line).
The figure shows that both measures display the same pattern in aggregate corporate payouts over
the last 40 years.
[Figure 13 about here.]
We also compute the gross payout share share (GPS ) of the non-financial corporate sector.
The numerator adds the consumption of fixed capital δKt to the payouts Dt:
GPSt =
(Dt + δKt)
Yt − Sat
=
Yt − S
a
t − Compt − Taxt − (It − δKt)
Yt − Sat
.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show that, after an initial decrease, the GPS increases from 11.5% in
1970-74 to 22.3% in 2000-04 with FoF data. With NIPA data, the increase is from 11.8% to 20.5%.
6.3.4 Corporate Payouts in Compustat
As a third measure, we used Compustat’s data and aggregate firm-level payouts to compute ag-
gregate payouts. Since we do not have value-added data for the firms in Compustat, we define a
net payout ratio NPR as:
NPRt =
Dt
Compt +Dt
.
Appendix A.3 contains the details on measurement. In Columns (2) and (4) of Table 8 we use
Compustat information on labor and retirement expenses to form Compt. Since this information is
missing for many firms, we alternatively compute Compt as the product of the number of employees
from Compustat (which is available for most firms) and the average wage per job from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics in the industry the firm operates in. The corresponding NPR measures start
in 1976 and are reported in Columns (3) and (5). Columns (2) and (3) are NPR measures that
include net debt repurchases, while Columns (4) and (5) exclude them. The latter measures are
useful because the net debt repurchase series from Compustat are highly volatile. All four series in
Columns (2)-(5) show a 5-7% increase in the NPR between 1975-79 and 2000-04. This is somewhat
16To make the NIPA payouts comparable to the Flow of Funds payouts, we add foreign earnings retained abroad
and net capital transfers (both from the Flow of Funds) to the NIPA payouts. The reason is that the FoF series
contains these foreign payouts, whereas the NIPA measure does not. Whether earnings are retained abroad or at
home does not matter for investors in US corporations.
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smaller than the 10.8% increase in the NPR rate in the Flow of Funds data, which is reported
in Column (1) for comparison. However, the increase is still substantial. The Compustat NPR
measures are much higher than the NPR from the FoF. In the Compustat data, we cannot net out
payments among firms in the non-financial corporate sector. In addition, Compustat only covers
large firms. Finally, we do not have data on IPOs, which should be counted as new issuance of
equities in total payouts. The Flow of Funds data does take all these issues into account. However,
the secular change we documented in NIPA and FoF data also arises in the Compustat data.
[Table 8 about here.]
6.4 Measuring Valuation
The increase in the payouts to securities holders over the last 30 years coincided with a doubling
of Tobin’s average q and the value-output ratio. Tobin’s q is measured as the market value of US
non-financial corporations, constructed from the Flow of Funds data divided by the replacement
cost of physical capital:
qat =
V at
Kt
.
We construct the replacement cost of physical capital using the perpetual inventory method with
FoF investment and inventory data (see Appendix A.1). The first column in Table 9 shows that
Tobin’s q decreased from 2.0 in the 1965-1969 period to 1.0 in the 1975-1979 period. After that,
it gradually increases to 2.6 in the 1995-1999 period and then it levels off to 2.3 and 2.0. The
value-output ratio for the US corporate sector, reported in Column 2, is computed as the ratio of
V at to gross value-added Yt. It tracks the evolution of Tobin’s q almost perfectly. The third column
reports the ratio of net payouts to the value of the corporate sector, D/V a; its is the net payout
yield of the (non-financial) corporate sector.
The table shows that the value of US corporations per unit of physical capital has more than
doubled since the late seventies. As a result, the measured increase in payouts to the owners of US
corporations over the same period (third column) cannot be explained as merely compensation for
physical capital. Rather the increase in valuations seems to be linked to the increase in payouts
due to the accumulation of organizational capital rather than physical capital.17
[Table 9 about here.]
6.5 Evidence from the Cross-Section
Our analysis so far focused on the time-series relationship between the composition of productivity
growth and the payout share, reallocation rate, and Tobin’s q. In the model, these same relation-
17Likewise, the increase in Tobin’s q cannot be explained solely by a decrease in taxes. Indeed, in a model without
organizational capital and no adjustment costs, Tobin’s q is always one. In a world with reasonable adjustment
costs, a decrease in taxes could increase Tobin’s q above one, but only temporarily. Finally, the large deviations of
Tobin’s q from one occur in the second half of the sample when the average tax rate is slightly increasing.
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ships hold in the cross-section. We investigate now in the data whether the same relationships
hold in the cross-section of industries. The empirical relationships we uncover are supportive of
the main mechanism in the model.
We identify high vintage-specific growth industries as those with high reallocation rates. The
key question then becomes whether industries characterized by high vintage-specific growth have
lower payout and valuation ratios.18 We build a panel of 55 industries at the 2-digit SIC level
covering the 1976-2005 sample. The payout data are from Compustat. The employment data
are from the QCEW program (see Appendices A.3 and A.5 for details). As before, we exclude
the financial sector. To gauge the effects of reallocation on payout ratios in the cross-section
of industries, we estimate fixed-effects regression of the payout ratios on the reallocation rates,
excess reallocation rates and the reallocation rates interacted with the ratio of intangibles to
physical capital (property, plants and equipment). Table 10 lists the results from four different
specifications. In Column (1) we use the excess reallocation rate (EREALL), in Column (2) we use
the reallocation rate (REALL), which is measured as the sum of job creation and job destruction
rates. We find that payout ratios tend to to be lower when the reallocation rates are higher,
and they tend to decline, when the reallocation rates increase, consistent with the theory. These
results are statistically significant and quite robust across different specifications and samples. On
average, a one standard deviation increase in the reallocation rate in an industry decreases the
payout ratio by about 1.8 percentage points. In Columns (3) and (4) we interact the reallocation
effect with the ratio of intangibles to plants, property and equipment (INTAN ). Intangibles are
a proxy for the organization-capital intensity of an industry. The effect of reallocation on payout
ratios is much larger in industries with more intangible assets.
[Table 10 about here.]
We also examined the cross-sectional relationship between reallocation and the average Tobin’s
q in the same panel of 55 industries. Table 11 reports the results. We use two different measures
for the average Tobin’s q in each industry. The first measure (Columns 1 and 2) uses total assets
less financial assets at book value in the denominator. The second measure (Columns 3 and 4)
uses the book value of total assets in the denominator. The numerator in both ratios is the market
value of the firm. Appendix A.3 provides more details. We find that an increase in the reallocation
rate tends to lower Tobin’s q. The results are statistically significant at the 1% level across all four
specifications. A one percentage point drop in the reallocation rate increases Tobin’s q by 0.12.
[Table 11 about here.]
18The results of Edmans (2007) empirically suggest a positive relationship between human capital and shareholder
value.
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7 Conclusion
Total payouts received by owners of US non-financial corporations increased from 1.7% of gross
value-added in the first half of the 1970s to 9.4% in the first half of the 2000s. In the same
period, there has been a marked increase in managerial compensation inequality. This paper
argues that both changes can be tied to the information technology revolution and the increases
in organizational capital that resulted from it.
In our model, establishments combine organizational capital, physical capital and unskilled la-
bor to produce output. The division of organizational rents between the owner and the manager
of the establishment is governed by a long-term compensation contract. The well-diversified owner
will offer insurance to the risk averse manager, but this insurance is limited by the manager’s abil-
ity to leave and by the owner’s limited liability. Because the manager can transfer a fraction of the
organizational capital to a future employer, the increased accumulation of organizational capital
after the IT revolution improves the outside option of successful managers. Optimal managerial
compensation increases in response to positive performance. In less productive, unsuccessful firms,
compensation does not change. Together they account for the increase in compensation inequality.
The owner’s payouts are optimally more sensitive to performance than the manager’s compensa-
tion. Put differently, the owner receives a small fraction of the payouts from small, unsuccessful
establishments, but a large fraction of the organizational rents generated by large successful estab-
lishments. The IT revolution generates more heterogeneity in firm performance and therefore more
risk to the owner. The owner’s payouts correspondingly increase. Additionally, the model generates
an increase in firm valuation relative to the physical capital or to output, which reflects the higher
value of organizational capital. It is also broadly consistent with trends in labor reallocation, the
firm size distribution, and firm exit and entry.
More broadly, this paper attempts to study the macro-economic implications from technological
change. We have shown that the interaction of micro-level frictions in compensation contracts and a
change in productivity growth prompted by the IT revolution can go a long way towards accounting
for several macro trends in the data. Simultaneously, the model has implications for the cross-
sectional distribution of size, book-to-market, productivity, and wages at the establishment-level.
Several of these implications deserve further study.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Using Flow of Funds Data
The computation of firm value returns is based on Hall (2001). The data to construct our measure of
returns on firm value were obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds, henceforth FoF. 19 We use the
(seasonally-unadjusted) flow tables for the non-farm, non-financial corporate sector, in file UTABS 102D.
We calculate the market value of the corporate sector V a as the market value of equity (item 1031640030)
plus net financial liabilities. Net financial liabilities are defined as financial liabilities (item 144190005)
minus financial assets (item 144090005). Because outstanding bonds (a part of financial liabilities) are
valued at book value, we transform them into a market value using the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index.
We construct the levels from the flows by adding them up, except for the Market Value of Equity. This
series is downloaded directly from the Balance series BTABS 102D. (item 103164003).
Net (aggregate corporate) pay-outs is measured as dividends (item 10612005) plus the interest paid on
debt (from the NIPA Table 1.14 on the Gross Product of Non-financial, Corporate Business, line 25) less
the net issuance of equity (item 103164003) less the increase in net financial liabilities (item 10419005).
The same NIPA Table 1.14 is used to obtain gross value-added (line 17), Yt − S
a
t .
Finally, capital expenditures (item 105050005) are obtained from the Flow of Funds.
Tobin’s q for the non-financial sector is constructed as the ratio of the market value of the corporate sector
V a and the replacement cost of physical capital (K). We construct the replacement cost of physical capital
using the perpetual inventory method with FoF investment data (item 105013003) and inventory data
(item 10502005). To deflate the series, we use the implicit deflator for fixed non-residential investment
from NIPA, Table 7.1. The depreciation rate is set to 2.6% per quarter.
Decomposing the Payout Share Table 12 decomposes the payout share into a dividend yield
component (Column 1), an interest component (Column 2), a net debt repurchase component (Column
3), and a net equity repurchase component (Column 4). Over the 1965-2004 period, cash payments
increased from 5.5% to 8% of value-added, while the net repurchase share increased from -3.3% to 1.2%.
The cash component accounts for most of the increase in the first half of the sample, while the repurchase
component accounts for the bulk of the change in the last twenty years. Until the 1985-89 period, US
corporations were issuing debt, and to a lesser extent equity, at a high rate. Afterwards, they started to
buy back equity, and to a lesser extent debt, instead. At the end of the sample the composition of the non-
cash component changes. Between 2005.I and 2007.I, US corporations issued debt to the tune of 5.8% of
value-added, and used this debt to buy back 7.3% of value-added in equity, presumably because of the low
cost of debt. Indeed, Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Brav, Graham, Harvey and
Michaely (2005), and others have argued that equity repurchases have substituted for dividend payments
over the last 20 years. Baker and Wurgler (2004) evaluate alternative theories for the propensity to pay
dividends. Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson and Roberts (2004) investigate the importance of total equity
payout yields for stock return predictability. There are many reasons, including taxes and flexibility, why
firms may prefer to substitute dividends for interests or cash for non-cash payments.
[Table 12 about here.]
19Data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ RELEASES/z1/current/data.htm
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A.2 Using NIPA Data
To compute the payouts using National Income and Product Accounts, henceforth NIPA, data for the
US non-financial corporate sector, we use Table 1.14. on Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic
Corporate Business in Current and Chained Dollars.20.
Payouts are the sum of cash and net repurchases. The cash payouts are defined as the sum of net dividend
payments (line 30) plus interest payments (line 25). Net repurchases are the difference between internal
funds and capital expenditures. Capital expenditures are from the Flow of Funds, as defined above.
Internal funds can be computed in a direct and an indirect way.
Internal funds (indirect measure) can be defined as gross value added (line 17) minus compensation of
employees (line 20) minus taxes on production and imports less subsidies (line 23) minus business current
transfer payments (line 26) minus taxes on corporate income (line 28) minus cash payouts (line 25+30).
In other words, internal funds IF are given by: IFt = Yt − S
a
t − Compt − Taxt −D
c
t .
Equivalently, internal funds (direct measure) are defined as profits before tax without inventory valu-
ation and capital consumption adjustment (line 36) minus taxes on corporate income (line 28) minus net
dividends (line 30) plus capital consumption adjustment (line 39) plus inventory valuation adjustment
(line 38) plus consumption of fixed capital (line 18).
The direct measure to calculate Internal Funds exactly mimics the way the Flow of Funds calculates
Internal Funds.21 To make the payouts comparable to the Flow of Funds series, we follow the construction
methodology in the Flow of Funds and add Foreign Earnings Retained Abroad (FoF: FU266006105.Q) and
Net Capital Transfers (FoF: FU105400313.Q) to Internal Funds. After all, this represents foreign-earned
income that accrues to the shareholders.
Capital Share In macroeconomics, the capital share is commonly assumed to be constant. This is
not inconsistent with a large increase in the gross payout share. We define the capital share
CS =
Yt − S
a
t − Compt
Yt − Sat
=
Taxt
Yt − Sat
+
It − δKt
Yt − Sat
+GPS.
The second equality shows that the capital share can be decomposed as the share of taxes in value-added
plus the share of net investment in value-added plus the gross payout share. The first column of Table
13 shows that the capital share fluctuates, but only moderately. It is equal to 33% both at the beginning
(1970-74) and at the end (2000-04) of our sample. However, the composition of the capital share shifts
dramatically. The 3.1% decline in the share of taxes (Column 2) and the 4.4% decline in the net investment
share (Column 3) are offset by a 7.5% increase in the gross payout share (Column 4).
[Table 13 about here.]
20Data are available at http://bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp
21See http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/Z1/Current/Coded/ - Flow Tables - Page 13, rows 1 through
9.
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A.3 Using Compustat Data
We use annual and quarterly data from Compustat.22 If an item from Compustat is not available quarterly,
we use its annual figure for each quarter, dividing by four if it is a flow variable. For each industry, the net
payout ratio is defined as the ratio of payouts to security holders over payouts to workers plus security
holders.
Payouts Payouts to security holders are computed as the sum of interest expense (item 22), dividends
from preferred stock (item 24), dividends from common stock (item 20) and equity repurchases, computed
as the difference between the purchase (annual item 115) and the sale (annual item 108) of common and
preferred stock. If there is no information available on the purchase and sale of stock, we assume that it
is zero.
Payouts to workers are computed as the product of number of employees (Compustat, annual item 29)
and wages per employee (see Appendix A.5 below). We only include those firms for which the payouts to
security holders is less than the firm assets (annual item 6).
The intangibles ratio is defined as the ratio of intangibles (annual item 33) to net property, plant and
equipment (PPE, annual item 8). We filter out those firms whose intangibles ratio is greater than 1000.
The intangibles ratio for each industry is then computed as the total intangibles over the total PPE for
each industry.
Tobin’s q The variable q1 is computed first for all firms having the following items available from COM-
PUSTAT: DATA1 (Cash and Short-Term Investments), DATA2 (Receivables - Total), DATA6 (Assets -
Total), DATA9 (Long-Term Debt - Total), DATA34 (Debt in Current Liabilities), DATA56 (Preferred
Stock - Redemption Value), DATA68 (Current Assets - Other), and the following items available from
CRSP: PRC (Closing Price of Bid/Ask average), SHROUT (Number of shares outstanding). For each
firm, Tobin’s q is defined as follows
q1 =
totalvaluefirm
DATA6 - fin assets
,
where:
totalvaluefirm = mcap+ totaldebt− fin assets
totaldebt = DATA9 +DATA34 +DATA56
fin assets = DATA1 +DATA2 +DATA68
mcap = PRC ∗ SHROUT/1000.
We select only those firms for which 0 < q1 < 100. For the selected firms, we compute industry I’s Tobin’s
q as :
q1,agg =
∑
i∈I totalvaluefirmi∑
i∈I DATA6i − fin assetsi
.
22Data are available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/
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We use a second definition of Tobin’s q. The variable q2 is defined as :
q2 =
firm value
DATA6
,
where
firm value = mcap+DATA6−DATA60−DATA74
mcap = PRC ∗ SHROUT/1000
and computed for all firms having the necessary items available in COMPUSTAT. We select only those
firms for which 0 < q2 < 100. For the selected firms, we compute industry I’s average q as:
q2,agg =
∑
i∈I firm valuei∑
i∈I DATA6i
A.4 Manufacturing
We checked our findings by recomputing payout shares and valuation ratios for the US manufacturing
sector. Much of the literature on the size distribution of establishments focusses on manufacturing. The
NPS increases from 6.5% in the late seventies to 15.7% in the early 2000s, an increase of 9.2 percentage
points. Over the same period, Tobin’s q for the manufacturing sector more than doubles from .74 to 1.74.
These trends are similar to the entire non-financial corporate sector.
[Table 14 about here.]
A.5 Labor Reallocation
We use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) program.23 This program reports monthly employment and quarterly wages data at the SIC
code level from 1975 to 2000, and at the NAICS code level from 1990 to 2005. Since there is no one-to-one
correspondence between SIC and NAICS codes, we form industries at the 2-digit SIC code level that
match industries at the 3-digit NAICS code level. We finally end up with 55 different industries, that
match to only 47 different Compustat industries. We exclude the financial sector from our calculations.
The employment data from the QCEW program is spliced in 1992.
We first compute the change in employment from month to month at the SIC and NAICS code level.
If it is positive it is recorded as Job Creation, otherwise it corresponds to Job Destruction. We then
aggregate Job Creation, Job Destruction and Employment by quarter, and de-seasonalize each of these
series separately using the X12-arima from the Census. Job Reallocation is then computed as the sum
of Job Creation and Job Destruction, divided by Employment. Excess Job Reallocation is computed
as the sum of Job Creation and Job Destruction minus the absolute change in Employment, divided by
Employment.
23Data are available at http://www.bls.gov/
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A.6 Managerial Wage Data from Current Population Survey
We use the IPUMS-CPS data on respondents’ annual wage earnings from 1971-2006. Managerial occu-
pations are defined as follows: for 1971-82, (previous year) occupation codes 220-246 except 221 and 226;
for 1983-1991, codes 003-019; for 1992-2002, codes 003-022; and codes 001-043 after 2002. We restrict
the sample to managers who were over 21 years old, were employed in the private sector, and who were
full-time workers in the previous year (i.e., they averaged at least 35 hours per week). We drop observa-
tions with annual earnings less than $2000 in 1983$. Finally, because wages are subject to top-coding,
we follow Autor et al. (2007) and multiply top-codes by 1.5 (this adjustment only affects the reported
standard deviations, not the IQR or IDR). The final sample size is about 3000 managers in the 1970s and
grows to around 6000 managers in the 2000s.
B Steady-State Growth Path
Definition 1. A steady-state growth path is defined as a path for which aggregate establishment pro-
ductivity {At} and the productivity of the newest vintage {θt} grow at a constant rate gθ, the variables
{rt, Rt, Nt} are constant, the economy-wide productivity-level grows at a constant rate gz, and all aggregate
variables {Yt,Kt,Wt, St, Ct,Dt, V
a
t } grow at a constant rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν .
Along the steady-state growth path, the measure over establishment productivity and promised utilities
satisfies:
Ψt+1,s+1(A, v) = Ψt,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
,
the measure of active establishments satisfies:
λt+1,s(A, v) = λt,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
,
and the value of an establishment of vintage s evolves according to:
Vt+1(A, v; s + 1) = (1 + g)Vt
(
A
1 + gθ
, v(1 + g)1−γ , s
)
.
To construct the steady-state growth path, we normalize variables in efficiency units. This allows us
to restate the production technology as follows :
y˜t = k˜
αν
t ,
where a variable with a tilde, x˜t, denotes the variable, x, expressed in per capita terms and in adjusted
efficiency units of the latest vintage (blueprint):
x˜t =
xt
z
1
1−αν
t θ
1−ν
1−αν
t
.
41
We have normalized the population L to one.
As noted in the main text, we normalize productivity by the blueprint level of technology, and denote
the normalized variables with a hat: Ât = At/θt. By construction, Â ≥ 1 for a new establishment (vintage
zero). The organizational capital of existing establishments in the new efficiency units shrinks at a rate
(1 + gθ). See equation (3.13). This notation allows us to reformulate the optimal contract along the
steady-state growth path.
The owner maximizes his value V̂ (Â, v˜) by optimally choosing current compensation c˜ and future
promised utilities v˜′(·):
V˜ (Â, v˜) = max
[
V̂ (Â, v˜), 0
]
and
V̂ (Â, v˜) = max
c˜,v˜′(·)
[
y˜ − W˜ −Rk˜ − c˜
+e−(ρo−(1−γ)ĝ)
∫
V˜ (Â′, v˜′)Γ(ε′)dε′,
]
subject to the law of motion for organizational capital in (3.13), the promise keeping constraint
v˜ = u(c˜) + e−(ρm−(1−γ)ĝ)
[∫
βs′(v˜, ε
′)v˜′(Â′)Γ(ε′)dε′ + ω˜(Â′)
∫
(1− β(v˜, ε′))Γ(ε′)dε′
]
, (B.1)
and subject to participation constraints for all Â′:
v˜′(Â′) ≥ ω˜(Â′).
The indicator variable β is one if continuation is optimal and zero elsewhere:
β = 1 if v˜′
(
Â′
)
≤ v˜∗(Â′)
β = 0 elsewhere
The outside option process is determined in equilibrium by the zero-profit condition for new entrants:
V̂
(
max(Âφ, 1), ω(Â)
)
= S, (B.2)
Equation (B.2) implies that the outside option ω(Ât) is constant in the range A ∈ [0, φ
−1]. We refer to
this range as the insensitivity region, because the outside option does not depend on the organizational
capital accumulated in the current establishment. When the fraction of capital φ that is portable is zero,
the outside option is constant for all A > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. The first-order condition implies that compensation c˜ is constant as long as the participation
constraint does not bind. When a new match is formed, the normalized promised utility v˜ starts off
at v˜0 = ω(Ât). The dynamics of the optimal wage contract can be characterized by setting up the
Lagrangian. Let µ denote the multiplier on the promised utility constraint and let λ(Â′) denote the
multiplier on the participation constraint in state Â′. We assume V̂ (·) is strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable. When the participation constraint Â′ does not bind (λ(Â′) = 0), conditional
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on continuation of the relationship (β = 1), the law of motion for the promised utility in efficiency units
v˜ satisfies the first order condition:
µ =
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′)
∂v˜′
The left hand side is the cost to the owner of increasing the manager’s compensation today. It equals
µ, the shadow price of a dollar today, from the envelope condition. From the first order condition for
consumption we know that µ = 1/uc(c˜). The right-hand side is the cost of increasing the manager’s
compensation tomorrow, from the first-order condition for v˜′. From the envelope condition, this equals
µ′ = 1/uc(c˜
′). So, the first order condition implies that consumption c˜ must be constant over time, as long
as the manager’s participation constraint does not bind. As a result, actual managerial compensation c
grows at the rate of output growth g on the steady-state growth path. When the participation constraint
does bind, the following inequality obtains:
µ <
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′)
∂v˜′
The utility cost of increasing the manager’s compensation to the owner increases. From the concavity of
u(·), it follows that the manager’s promised utility and current compensation (in efficiency units) increase
when the participation constraint binds. When the constraint does bind, we increase c˜ to make sure the
constraint holds with equality. This is optimal (see Kuhn-Tucker conditions).
This suggests a simple consumption rule is optimal. We conjecture the optimal consumption function
C
(
v˜, Â
)
such that:
C
(
v˜, Â
)
= u−1c (1/µ)
where µ = −∂V̂ (Â,v˜)
∂v˜
. Define the running maximum of Â as Âmax,t = max{Âτ , τ ≤ t}. In addition, let T
denote the random stopping time when the match gets terminated because of zero surplus:
T = inf{τ ≥ 0 : V̂ (Âτ , v˜τ ) = 0}
Compensation is determined by the running maximum of productivity for all 0 < t < T :
ct = c(Âmax,t) = max
{
c0, C
(
ω(Âmax,t), Âmax,t
)}
.
This consumption function satisfies the necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions if the continuation
probability β is non-increasing in Â. This being the case, the participation constraint only binds if
Â exceeds it previous maximum. It is easy to verify that β is indeed non-increasing in Â given this
consumption function.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The discount rate wedge induces a downward drift in the manager’s consumption and promised
utility. When the participation constraint does not bind, the envelope condition and the first order
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condition for v˜′ imply the following:
−∂V̂ (Â, v˜)
∂v˜
= µ = e(ρm−ρo)
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′′)
∂v˜′
Because eρm−ρo > 1, the owner’s utility cost of providing compensation tomorrow is lower than µ, the
cost today. As a result, the optimal promised utility is decreasing over time. Because µ = u−1c (c˜), this
also implies that current consumption drifts down. By construction, this consumption policy satisfies the
necessary and sufficient first order conditions for optimality.
C Transition Experiment
Definition 2. A constant-discount rate transition between two steady state growth paths is defined as a
path for which the productivity of the newest vintage grows at rate gt,θ, the economy-wide productivity-level
grows at a rate gz,t, and all aggregate variables {Yt,Kt, wt, Ct}t=0,T have a constant trend growth rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν .
The rental rate on capital Rt and the discount rate rt are constant. The measure over promised utilities
and establishment productivity satisfies (3.10) and (3.11) during the transition. At t = T , this economy
reaches its new steady-state growth path. So for i > 1:
ΨT+i,s(A, v) = ΨT+i−1,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
(C.1)
λT+i,s(A, v) = λT+i−1,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
. (C.2)
Output deviates from its trend growth path during the transition because the average establishment
productivity level deviates from its initial steady-state growth path {Aold,t}. The average productivity
levels changes, because the joint measure over establishment-specific productivity and promised utility is
changing. Along the transition path, we check that the rental rate for physical capital is constant:
Rt = αvK˜
αν−1
new,t = αv
(
K˜old,t
)αν−1
,
where K˜t =
Kt
A
1−ν
1−αv
t z
1
1−αν
t
denotes the capital stock in adjusted efficiency units. The aggregate capital stock
is adjusted such that
ϕt =
K̂new,t
K̂old,t
=
(
Anew,t
Aold,t
) 1−ν
1−αv
.
Capital is supplied perfectly elastically at a constant interest rate. Along the transition path, all aggregate
variables {Ynew,t,Knew,t,Wnew,t, Cnew,t}t=0,T are scaled up by ϕt. This is the productivity adjustment
relative to the old steady-state growth path. Once we have computed {ϕt}, we can back out the transition
path for all the other variables.
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Reverse Shooting Algorithm The objective is to compute the transition for the value function,
aggregate productivity, the outside option function and the joint measure over promised consumption
and productivity {Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}. We start in the new steady state with the new vintage-specific
growth rate gθ,T at T , and the “stationary” joint measure ΨT,s over organizational capital and promised
consumption, which satisfy the conditions in equation (C.2). We conjecture a {ϕt}
T
t=0 sequence. Because
we know V̂T , the owner’s value of an establishment at the beginning of period t can be constructed
recursively, starting in i = 1:
V̂T−i(Â, v˜; s) = max
c˜,v˜′t(·)
[
y˜T−i+1 −W −Rk˜T−i+1 − c˜T−i+1
+R−1(1 + g)
∫
V˜T−i+1(Â
′, v˜′; s+ 1) Qs′(ε
′)dε′
]
,
subject to the law of motion for capital in (3.13), the promised consumption constraint in (B.1), and a
series of participation constraints:
v˜′ ≥ ω˜T−i+1(A
′)
and, finally, the value of the firm is defined as:
V˜T−i(Â, v˜) = max
[
V̂T−i(Â, v˜), 0
]
.
We solve for {Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}
T
t=1 starting in the last period T .
Simulating Forward Next, we simulate this economy forward, starting at the initial values for(
V0, A0, ω0,Ψ0,s, λ0,s
)
in the old steady-state growth path, using our solution for the transition path
{Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}
T
t=1. We use a sample of N = 5000 establishments. This gives us a new guess for the
aggregate establishment productivity series and hence for {ϕ′t}
T
t=0. We continue iterating until we achieve
convergence.
D Calibration Details
To calibrate the depreciation rate, the tax rate and the capital share αν, we used mostly NIPA data.
Let CFC denote the consumption of fixed capital. Let KINV denote the stock of inventories, obtained
from NIPA Table 5.7.5B. (Private Inventories and Domestic Final Sales by Industry). Let KES denote
fixed assets, obtained from NIPA Table 6.1. (Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Group and Legal Form of Organization). The depreciation rate is computed as
δ = CFC/(KES +KINV ).
The average tax rate τc is computed as follows. Let CT denote corporate taxes, let NP denote net product,
let ST denote Sales Taxes, and let SLPTR denote state and local taxes. The tax rate is computed as
τc = CT/(NP − CE − ST ),
where we compute ST as CT − RATIO × SLPTR and RATIO is the average ratio of fixed assets held
by non-farm, non-financial corporations to total fixed assets.
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To compute the average cost of capital r, we computed the weighted-average of the average return
on equity and the average return on corporate bonds over the period 1950-2005. The average return on
corporate bonds was computed using the Dow Jones corporate bond index.24. The average return on
equity is computed from the log price/dividend ratio and a constant real growth rate for dividends of
1.8%, the average growth rate over the sample.25 The dividend series and the price/dividend ratio from
CRSP are adjusted for repurchases. The weights in the average are based on the aggregate market value
of equity and corporate bonds. The resulting average cost of capital is 5.5%.
24Data are available at http://www.globalfinancialdata.com
25Data are available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu
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Figure 1: Optimal Compensation and Size
This figure plots the running maximum of productivity on the horizontal axis, Âmax,t against current productivity,
Ât, on the vertical axis. It considers the case in which managers and owners share the same rate of time preference
ρm = ρo.
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Figure 2: Value vs. Growth
This figure plots the ratio of current and the running maximum of productivity on the horizontal axis, Ât/Âmax,t
against current productivity, Ât, on the vertical axis. It considers the case in which managers and owners share the
same rate of time preference ρm = ρo.
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Figure 3: Optimal Compensation Contract
The left panel plots the current productivity At (y-axis) against the running maximum Amax,t (x-axis). The right
panel figure plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line) alongside the
evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital Â (full line). The latter is a measure of size and productivity
of the establishment. The two time-series are produced by simulating model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under
the benchmark calibration described below (φ = .5), except that the time discount rates of owners and managers
are held equal: ρo = ρm.
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Figure 4: Payouts to Manager and Owner
The left panel plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line, measured
against the right axis) alongside the evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital Â (full line, measured
against the left axis). The right panel plots the payouts to the owner pi. The two time-series are produced by
simulating the model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under the benchmark calibration described below, except
that the time discount rates of owners and managers are held equal: ρo = ρm.
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Figure 5: Payouts to Manager and Owner: Discount Rate Wedge
The left panel plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line, measured against
the right axis) alongside the evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital log Â (full line, measured against
the left axis). The right panel plots the payouts to the owner pi. The two time-series are produced by simulating
the model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under the benchmark calibration described below, except that the time
discount rates of owners and managers are held equal: ρo < ρm.
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Figure 6: Summary Transitional Dynamics of Key Aggregates
The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after
1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Figure 7: From Low-Powered to High-Powered Incentives
Plot of log compensation against log size of establishment. The left panel shows the initial steady-state growth path
(high vintage-specific growth). The right panel shows the new steady-state growth path (high general productivity
growth). The data are generated form the model under its benchmark calibration.
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Figure 8: Compensation and Size Distribution in the New Steady State
Histogram of log compensation and log size of establishments. The data are generated form the model’s new steady
state (high general productivity growth) under its benchmark calibration.
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Figure 9: Size Distribution in the New Steady State
The figure plots the relationship between the log size of establishments on the horizontal axis and the rank in the
distribution log(Rank − .5) on the vertical axis. The figure is for the new steady state growth path under our
benchmark calibration.
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Figure 10: Cross-section of Managerial Wealth-to-Output
This figure shows the ratio of managerial wealth to aggregate output at different percentiles. We ranked estab-
lishments according to managerial compensation. The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0
before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The results
are for the benchmark parameters.
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Figure 11: From Low-Powered to High-Powered Incentives - High Portability
Plot of log compensation against log size of establishment. The left panel shows the initial steady-state growth path
(high vintage-specific growth). The right panel shows the new steady-state growth path (high general productivity
growth). The data are generated form the model under its benchmark calibration, except that φ = .75.
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Figure 12: Excess Reallocation Rate
The dashed line is the excess reallocation rate for the manufacturing sector, constructed by Faberman (2006). The
excess job reallocation rate is a direct measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of establishment growth rates. It is
defined as the the sum of the job creation rate plus the job destruction rate less the net employment growth rate.
The Faberman data are extended to 2007.I using BLS data. The solid line is the 8-quarter moving average.
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Excess Reallocation Rate in US Manufacturing
53
Figure 13: Payout Share: FoF vs. NIPA
The dashed line is the 8-quarter moving average of the net payout share (NPS), defined as the sum of net payouts
to securities holders, divided by value-added, computed using NIPA data for the non-financial corporate sector.
The full line is the 8-quarter moving average of the net payout share (NPS) computed using FoF data for the
non-financial, non-farm corporate sector.
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Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Source
ν .75 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
δ .06 NIPA
α .30 K/Y = 1.77
r .055 FoF,CRSP,DJCBI
ρo .02
ρo .03
γ 1.6 equation (3.8)
g .022 NIPA
ms 0
σs 19% exc. reall. rate job reallocation - QCEW BLS
S 5% exit rate entry and exit
φ 0.5 wage inequality - QCEW BLS
Notes: This Table lists our benchmark parameter choices. Section 5.2 justifies these choices and Appendix D provides more details on
the data we used. NIPA stands for National Income and Products Accounts, CRSP for Center for Research in Securities Prices, DJCBI
for Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index, QCEW stands for Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, and BLS for Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The abbreviation “exc. reall. rate” stands for excess reallocation rate in the initial steady state.
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Table 2: Compensation and Productivity Along the Transition Path
Log Compensation Log Productivity
Std IQR IDR Std IQR IDR
before 0.94 0.01 0.08 10.69 18.27 29.16
1971-1975 1.48 0.01 0.09 10.80 18.32 28.99
1976-1980 1.24 0.01 0.08 11.00 18.25 29.13
1981-1985 1.75 0.01 0.10 11.09 18.42 29.38
1986-1990 2.31 0.02 0.11 11.26 18.32 29.80
1991-1995 4.34 0.03 0.13 11.67 18.43 30.76
1996-2000 6.41 0.09 11.77 11.79 18.05 30.84
2001-2005 8.22 0.13 9.73 12.22 18.36 31.78
2006-2010 11.03 8.63 8.94 12.58 18.53 32.58
2011-2015 12.78 8.82 21.47 12.57 18.50 32.52
after 26.98 0.09 35.07 15.36 21.14 38.98
Notes: The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth
gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The table reports the cross-sectional standard
deviation (Std), inter-quartile range (IQR) and the inter-decile range (IDR) for log compensation log c˜ and log
productivity (1− ν) log Â in percentage points. The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table 3: Main Aggregates Along Transition Path
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EREALL EXIT NPS GPS Tobin’s q V
a
(Y−Sa)
Ma
(Y−Sa)
before 18.96 4.33 3.27 15.73 1.40 0.83 8.27
1971-1975 17.83 7.74 4.14 16.67 1.40 0.83 8.04
1976-1980 16.62 6.65 4.96 17.47 1.43 0.89 7.88
1981-1985 15.30 5.62 5.28 18.03 1.46 0.93 7.72
1986-1990 13.52 4.08 7.46 19.99 1.50 1.00 7.51
1991-1995 12.87 3.56 8.24 20.62 1.54 1.07 7.37
1996-2000 12.70 3.53 9.31 21.53 1.56 1.12 7.29
2001-2005 12.26 3.05 10.32 22.41 1.59 1.18 7.22
2006-2010 12.02 2.94 10.98 23.00 1.62 1.23 7.17
2011-2015 11.90 2.84 11.65 23.61 1.62 1.22 7.11
after 11.35 1.20 13.01 24.83 1.64 1.26 6.47
Notes: The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth
gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The table reports the excess job reallocation rate
(EREALL), the entry/exit rate (EXIT), the net payout share (NPS), the gross payout share GPS, Tobin’s q, the
ratio of aggregate firm value to output (V/(Y − Sa)), and the ratio of managerial wealth to output (M/(Y − Sa)).
The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table 4: Cross-section of Tobin’s Q
percentile 95 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1971-1975 1.94 1.82 1.68 1.56 1.45 1.35 1.26 1.18 1.11 1.05
1976-1980 2.02 1.89 1.73 1.59 1.48 1.38 1.28 1.20 1.13 1.06
1981-1985 2.07 1.94 1.77 1.63 1.51 1.40 1.31 1.22 1.14 1.07
1986-1990 2.15 1.99 1.81 1.67 1.55 1.44 1.34 1.24 1.16 1.08
1991-1995 2.27 2.07 1.87 1.72 1.59 1.47 1.36 1.27 1.18 1.09
1996-2000 2.34 2.10 1.88 1.74 1.61 1.50 1.39 1.29 1.19 1.10
2001-2005 2.42 2.16 1.92 1.77 1.63 1.52 1.41 1.30 1.20 1.11
2006-2010 2.48 2.21 1.96 1.80 1.66 1.53 1.42 1.31 1.21 1.11
2.76 2.40 2.07 1.88 1.73 1.59 1.45 1.33 1.23 1.13
Notes: The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth
gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The table reports the ratio of market value of the
establishment to the aggregate capital stock, at different percentiles of the cross-sectional market value distribution.
The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table 5: No Wedge
Log Wages Log TFP
Disp. IQR IDR Disp. IQR IDR
before 2.12 0.00 0.00 8.43 14.05 21.89
1971-1975 0.73 0.02 0.06 9.88 15.48 26.84
1976-1980 2.11 0.02 0.05 10.43 17.63 28.19
1981-1985 2.60 0.02 0.04 10.65 18.07 28.05
1986-1990 2.16 0.02 0.04 10.64 17.55 28.07
1991-1995 2.67 0.02 0.07 10.69 17.56 27.95
1996-2000 2.93 0.02 0.08 10.89 17.60 28.33
2001-2005 3.66 0.02 0.08 11.22 18.09 28.99
2006-2010 6.47 0.02 6.90 11.32 17.99 29.43
2011-2015 9.63 0.03 17.20 11.36 17.35 29.62
EREALL EXIT NPR GPR Tobin’sq
before 20.87 5.61 16.34 30.20 1.33
1971-1975 14.34 4.27 10.89 22.40 1.51
1976-1980 19.04 8.68 1.76 15.87 1.47
1981-1985 17.93 8.08 2.53 16.64 1.52
1986-1990 16.19 6.47 4.18 17.64 1.54
1991-1995 15.05 5.50 4.69 18.00 1.55
1996-2000 14.60 5.10 4.73 18.32 1.57
2001-2005 13.67 4.34 5.30 18.91 1.60
2006-2010 13.55 4.35 5.56 19.28 1.60
2011-2015 12.71 3.65 6.74 20.15 1.62
after 11.38 1.18 18.45 31.30 1.56
Notes: Benchmark Calibration. The match specificity parameter φ is .5. The economy transitions from (high) gθ,0
to (low) gθ,T in T = 20 years.
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Table 6: Increasing Wage Dispersion
Std Wages 75%-25% Wages 90%-10% Wages
Panel A: All Workers - Establishment-Level Data
1975-1979 21.4 29.1 53.2
1980-1984 22.9 29.3 57.2
1985-1989 24.2 30.8 58.5
1990-1994 25.1 31.6 61.1
1995-1999 26.9 32.8 65.7
2000-2004 28.7 34.5 67.9
Panel B: All Managers - Individual-Level Data
1975-1979 59.4 72.9 140.8
1980-1984 61.3 79.8 147.5
1985-1989 62.9 82.5 152.7
1990-1994 64.8 83.8 156.6
1995-1999 67.2 83.3 157.7
2000-2004 68.8 84.2 160.4
Panel C: Top-3 Managers in 50 Largest Firms
1975-1979 55.7 74.1 135.1
1980-1984 58.3 74.0 146.7
1985-1989 69.7 90.2 172.6
1990-1994 76.9 100.0 186.8
1995-1999 92.6 124.0 231.7
2000-2004 99.4 149.5 260.9
Notes: All three panels plot the cross-sectional standard deviation, inter-quartile range, and inter-decile range of log
wages. Statistics are averaged over 5-year periods. In Panel A, we measure intra-industry, between-establishment
wage inequality. The data are from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The unit of observation is an establishment, for which we know the average
wage. We calculate the within-industry wage dispersion from a panel of 55 2-digit SIC-code industries, and average
across industries. In Panel B, we use individual-level data from the Current Population Survey, March issue. We
select only the managerial occupations. Finally, Panel C uses data from Frydman and Saks (2006) for the three
highest-paid officers in the largest 50 firms in 1960 and 1990.
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Table 7: Payout Share for US Corporate Sector: FoF and NIPA Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPS FoF NPS NIPA GPS FoF GPS NIPA
1965-1969 2.36 3.66 11.82 13.11
1970-1974 1.74 1.99 11.53 11.78
1975-1979 1.06 2.70 10.68 12.32
1980-1984 3.51 4.42 15.58 16.50
1985-1989 3.08 7.26 16.08 20.26
1990-1995 8.26 7.61 20.20 19.55
1995-1999 7.86 6.21 19.86 18.21
2000-2004 9.41 7.64 22.26 20.49
2005-2007 6.73 7.61 15.97 16.85
Notes: NPS FoF is the net payout share, the ratio of net payouts to securities holders (Flow of Funds) to gross
value-added (NIPA) in the US non-farm, non-financial, corporate sector. GPS FoF is the gross payout share, the
ratio of gross payouts to securities holders (including consumption of fixed capital) to gross value-added in the US
non-farm, non-financial, corporate sector. We also report the same payout measures based on NIPA data in NPS
NIPA and GPS NIPA for the non-financial corporate sector.
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Table 8: Net Payout Ratio for US Non-financial Corporate Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FoF Compustat: Includes Debt Compustat: Excludes Debt
1965-1969 3.45 7.69 14.57
1970-1974 2.38 11.91 14.36
1975-1979 1.48 13.97 18.01 14.00 17.04
1980-1984 4.91 14.57 17.93 17.36 20.56
1985-1989 4.31 19.37 22.58 22.97 25.70
1990-1994 11.07 20.16 24.37 23.59 24.29
1995-1999 10.77 21.85 20.74 22.98 23.63
2000-2004 12.26 18.90 24.93 19.85 23.13
Notes: Net Payout Ratio for the non-financial corporate sector, based on Compustat data. The net payout ratio is
the ratio of net payouts to securities holders to the sum of payouts to securities holders and payouts to employees
Compt. Columns (2) and (4) use labor expenses plus retirement expenses reported in Compustat to measure Compt.
Columns (3) and (5) use BLS data on wages per sector to form Compt. The BLS data start only in 1976.
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Table 9: Valuation Ratios for US Corporate Sector
(1) (2) (3)
Tobin’s q V/(Y − Sa) D/(V − Sa)
1965-1969 1.96 1.80 1.29
1970-1974 1.49 1.54 0.98
1975-1979 0.97 1.13 0.86
1980-1984 0.94 1.16 2.95
1985-1989 1.33 1.49 2.00
1990-1994 1.70 1.82 4.52
1995-1999 2.58 2.53 3.21
2000-2004 2.33 2.41 4.08
2005-2007 2.02 2.15 3.13
Notes: Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of US corporations V a divided by the replacement cost of the
physical capital stock K. The value-output ratio (V/(Y − Sa)) is V a divided by value-added Y − Sa of the non-
financial corporate sector. The net payout yield is the ratio of net payouts D to the market value V a.
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Table 10: Cross-sectional Results: Payout Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.167 0.170 0.140 0.140
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
INTAN 0.075 0.084
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
EREALL -0.300 -0.071
(0.067)*** (0.068)
REALL -0.306 -0.061
(0.067)*** (0.067)
EREALL*INTAN -0.612
(0.063)***
REALL*INTAN -0.640
(0.064)***
∆ Payout Ratio / ∆ EREALL -0.273
(0.067)***
∆ Payout Ratio / ∆ REALL -0.272
(0.066)***
Number of Industries 47
Observations 5452
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table reports fixed effects estimates of
the Payout Ratio (Payout Ratio) on Excess Job Reallocation (EREALL), Job Reallocation (REALL), Intangibles
Ratio (INTAN ), the interaction of Excess Job Reallocation Intangibles Ratio (EREALLINTAN ) and the interaction
of Job Reallocation and Intangibles Ratio (REALL*INTAN ) for the periods 1976-2005. The definition of these
variables is detailed in Appendix A.3. Partial effects of changes in Excess Job Reallocation and Job Reallocation
on the Payout Ratio are also reported. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 11: Cross-sectional Results: Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.349 1.303 1.462 1.427
(0.021)*** (0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.012)***
EREALL -2.004 -1.507
(0.317)*** (0.229)***
REALL -1.462 -1.108
(0.320)*** (0.228)***
Number of Industries 47
Observations 5452
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table reports fixed effects estimates
of Tobin q1 and Tobin q2 on Excess Job Reallocation (EREALL), Job Reallocation (REALL), for the periods
1976-2005. The definition of these variables is detailed in Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
Table 12: Decomposition of the Net Payout Share
(1) (2) (1)+(2) (3) (4) (3)+(4)
Div Int Cash Debt Rep. Equity Rep. Repurchases
1965-1969 3.78 1.71 5.49 −2.98 −0.29 −3.27
1970-1974 2.91 2.88 5.79 −2.95 −1.22 −4.17
1975-1979 2.67 2.74 5.41 −4.12 −0.37 −4.49
1980-1984 2.96 3.80 6.76 −3.97 0.52 −3.46
1985-1989 3.06 4.01 7.08 −7.97 3.82 −4.16
1990-1994 4.02 3.74 7.76 0.21 0.24 0.46
1995-1999 4.70 2.90 7.60 −2.12 2.24 0.12
2000-2004 4.85 3.16 8.02 −0.16 1.36 1.20
2005-2007 3.73 2.05 5.78 −5.77 7.37 1.61
Notes: This table lists the components of the payouts to securities holders for the US non-financial corporate sector
as a fraction of value-added: dividend payments (Column 1), interest payments (Column 2), net debt repurchases
(Column 3) and net equity repurchases (Column 4). Cash payments are the sum of dividends and interest payments.
Repurchases are the sum of net debt and net equity debt repurchases. All series are scaled by aggregate gross value-
added, so that the table gives a decomposition of the Net Payout Share. This table uses data from the Flow of
Funds.
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Table 13: Link With Capital Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CS Taxes Net Inv GPS
1965-1969 35.85 16.28 8.81 10.76
1970-1974 32.99 15.23 7.99 9.78
1975-1979 33.73 14.30 7.59 11.84
1980-1984 33.62 12.50 6.58 14.53
1985-1989 34.24 12.90 4.58 16.75
1990-1994 34.04 13.22 3.75 17.07
1995-1999 35.19 13.22 6.43 15.55
2000-2004 33.14 12.14 3.60 17.40
2005-2007 35.37 13.99 3.08 18.30
Notes: This table lists the following ratios for the US non-financial corporate sector as a fraction of value-added:
capital share (column 1), taxes (column 2), net investment (I − δK) (column 3) and the gross payouts (column 4).
The last column is the difference between the first and the second and third. The small discrepancy arises because
the GPS measure does not adjust for foreign-earned payouts, unlike the measure in Table 7.
Table 14: US Manufacturing Sector
NPR Tobin’s q
1976-1979 6.51 0.75
1980-1984 9.10 0.74
1985-1989 15.32 1.02
1990-1994 14.15 1.16
1995-1999 17.00 1.80
2000-2005 15.68 1.74
Notes: The payout ratio is the ratio of payouts to securities holders to total payouts (to securities holders and
employees), based on Compustat data for publicly traded companies in the manufacturing sector. Tobin’s q is
computed as the value of all securities divided by the value of PPE (Property, Plants and Equipment).
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